Epistemic Indirect Realism (EIR) is the position that justification for contingent propositions about the extra-mental world requires an inference based on a subjective, experiential mental state. One objection against EIR is that it runs contrary to common sense and practice; in essence, ordinary people do not form beliefs about things in the external world on the basis of experiential mental states. This objection implies EIR is contrary to ordinary experience, impractical, and leads to scepticism. In this paper, I will defend EIR against this objection by distinguishing EIR based on conceptual awareness and non-conceptual awareness. In particular, I will argue that direct acquaintance provides sufficient (non-conceptual) awareness that can explain how ordinary folks are capable of forming justified beliefs about the external world in a way consistent with EIR. Overall, I present a framework for showing that EIR can satisfy ordinary epistemic practices without betraying human nature or over-intellectualizing the required epistemic standards for possessing a justified belief.

中文翻译：

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带有人脸的间接现实主义

认知间接实在论 (EIR) 是这样一种立场，即为关于超心理世界的偶然命题的辩护需要基于主观的、经验的心理状态的推理。反对 EIR 的一个反对意见是它与常识和实践背道而驰；本质上，常人并不是基于经验心理状态对外界事物形成信念。这种反对意味着 EIR 与普通经验相反，不切实际，并导致怀疑。在本文中，我将通过区分基于概念意识和非概念意识的 EIR 来为 EIR 反对这一反对意见。特别是，我会争辩说，直接熟人提供了足够的（非概念性的）意识，可以解释普通人如何能够以与 EIR 一致的方式形成关于外部世界的正当信念。总的来说，我提出了一个框架，表明 EIR 可以满足普通的认知实践，而不会背叛人性或将拥有正当信念所需的认知标准过度智能化。