Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the inner sense, functioning as a capacity of attention, helps us knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will explain how this second response answers the Buddhists’ challenge.

中文翻译：

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对象重新识别和注意力的认知作用

重新识别怀疑论认为我们不能有知识地重新识别以前感知的对象。在古典印度哲学家中，佛教徒主张重新认同怀疑论。在这篇文章中，我将讨论对这一佛教论点的两种回应。由 Vācaspati Miśra（公元 9 世纪）辩护的第一个反应是，我们的外部感官允许我们有知识地重新识别物体。我会声称这个提议是有问题的。第二个反应，由于 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa（公元 9 世纪），是法力或内在感觉，作为一种注意力的能力，帮助我们有知识地重新识别物体。我将解释第二个回应如何回答佛教徒的挑战。