If earlier-than-necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later-than-necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non-existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non-existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution. In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the same senses it is possible to live longer. I then offer a solution to the Asymmetry Problem by suggesting a novel way to separate the badness of each type of non-existence from the type, and frequency, of attitudes we should have towards each type of non-existence. Even if both types of non-existence are equally bad, certain contingent facts about our postmortem non-existence provide reason for the badness of early deaths to be more frequently salient than the badness of late conceptions.

中文翻译：

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避免不对称问题

如果早于必要的死亡是坏的，因为它剥夺了个人额外的美好生活，那么为什么晚于必要的受孕不是出于同样的原因是坏的？剥夺主义者认为，出生前不存在并不坏，因为不可能更早地受孕，但死后不存在是不好的，因为有可能活得更久。将此称为不可能的解决方案。在这篇论文中，我通过展示如何在相同意义上更早地受孕，证明不可能解决方案不起作用。然后，我提出了一种解决不对称问题的方法，提出了一种新颖的方法，将每种不存在的坏处与我们对每种不存在的态度的类型和频率分开。即使两种不存在都同样糟糕，