Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions are in fact being measured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices.

中文翻译：

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什么是隐性偏见？

在过去的几十年中，经验心理学研究计划使学者们提出了隐性偏见。这是由于创新行为措施的发展，这些行为措施揭示了我们认知的某些方面，而自我报告措施可能无法识别这些方面，需要个人反思并报告其态度和信念。但是，将这种偏见表征为隐性意味着什么？我们能否令人满意地阐明将其确定为偏见的理由？至关重要的是，实际上正在衡量什么样的认知。什么样的精神状态或过程是这种行为反应的基础？在本文中，我们概述了试图解决这三个问题时所涉及的一些哲学和经验问题。我们的目标是提供有关问题及其相互关系的建设性分类法。如我们所见，