Arguments for some controversial positions in metaethics—typically moral scepticism or the moral error theory—are sometimes thought to overreach. They appear to entail sceptical or error‐theoretic views about non‐moral branches of thought in a sense that is costly or implausible. If this is true, those metaethical arguments should be rejected. This is the companions in guilt strategy in metaethics. In this article, the contemporary use of the companions in guilt strategy is explored and assessed. The methodology of the strategy is discussed, and criteria for assessing specific instances of its use are identified. Prominent instances of its use in the contemporary literature are then examined. The focus is on those that take (a) epistemic judgment, (b) prudential judgment, and (c) mathematical judgment as “companions,” with a view to undermining the moral error theory and moral scepticism, respectively.

中文翻译：

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有罪感的同伴

在元伦理学中，一些有争议的立场（通常是道德怀疑论或道德错误理论）的论点有时被认为是过度的。它们似乎需要付出代价高昂或令人难以置信的对非道德思想分支的怀疑或错误理论观点。如果这是真的，那么那些亚伦理论据就应该被拒绝。这是元伦理学中内策略的伴随者。在本文中，探讨并评估了伴侣在有罪策略中的当代用法。讨论了该策略的方法，并确定了评估其使用特定情况的标准。然后研究其在当代文学中的显着实例。重点是那些将（a）认知判断，（b）审慎判断和（c）数学判断视为“同伴”，