Over several articles, John McDowell sketches an analogy between virtue and perception, whereby the virtuous person sees situations in a distinctive way, a way that explains her virtuous behavior. Central to this view is his notion of silencing, a psychological phenomenon in which certain considerations fail to operate as reasons in a virtuous person's practical reasoning. Despite its influence on many prominent virtue ethicists, McDowell's ‘silencing view’ has been criticized as psychologically unrealistic. In this article, I defend a silencing view of practical reasoning. I argue that the phenomenon of silencing has a narrower scope than is typically acknowledged. As a result, the view does not require the virtuous to be detached, unfeeling, or unpalatably stoic. Furthermore, I offer a psychologically plausible interpretation of McDowell's claim that the virtuous see situations in a distinctive sort of way. The salient fact at which the virtuous arrive in their view of a situation should be understood, I argue, in terms of subjective construal.

中文翻译：

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良性解释：为沉默辩护

在几篇文章中，约翰麦克道尔勾勒出美德和感知之间的类比，即有德行的人以独特的方式看待情况，这种方式可以解释她的德行行为。这种观点的核心是他的沉默概念，这是一种心理现象，在这种现象中，某些考虑不能作为有德之人实际推理的理由。尽管它对许多著名的美德伦理学家产生了影响，但麦克道尔的“沉默观点”被批评为在心理上不切实际。在这篇文章中，我为实践推理的沉默观点辩护。我认为沉默现象的范围比通常承认的要窄。因此，这种观点并不要求有德行的人是超然的、无情的或令人不快的坚忍。此外，我对麦克道尔的主张提供了一种心理上合理的解释，即有德行的人以一种独特的方式看待情况。我认为，贤者在他们对情况的看法中所达到的显着事实应该从主观解释的角度来理解。