I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.

中文翻译：

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经验的微观结构

我认为经验可以具有微观现象结构，我们内省的宏观现象属性是通过不可自省的微观现象属性实现的。在解释了将微观结构归因于体验意味着什么之后，我针对其主要的哲学挑战为该论文辩护，讨论该论文如何与其他有关经验的哲学问题相互作用，并考虑我们研究微观现象领域的前景。