This is a translation from Russian to English of Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky’s “Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля” (Husserl’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Idealism), published in the émigré journal Пyть (The Way) in 1939. In this article, Lossky presents and criticizes Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Like many successors of Husserl’s “Göttingen School,” Lossky interprets Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a Neo-Kantian idealism and he criticizes it on the ground that it leads to a form of solipsism. In light of his own epistemology (intuitivism) and his metaphysical system (ideal-realism), he also claims that, although Husserl is more radical than Descartes in his methodological doubt, he is not radical enough, because his abstention from existential judgment with regard to the external world is itself an existential judgment. In this regard, Lossky affirms that his own critically-informed defense of naive realism is in fact more radical than Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (Frédéric Tremblay)

中文翻译：

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胡塞尔的先验现象学唯心主义

这是 Nikolai Onufriyevich Lossky 的“Tpaнcцeндeнтaльнo-фeнoмeнoлoгичecкiй идeaлизмъ Гyccepля”（胡塞尔的超验现象学杂志发表在该杂志上的一篇俄文到英文译本）（Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological唯心主义。像胡塞尔“哥廷根学派”的许多后继者一样，洛斯基将胡塞尔的先验唯心主义解释为一种新康德唯心主义，并以它导致一种唯我主义形式为由加以批评。鉴于他自己的认识论（直觉主义）和他的形而上学体系（理想实在论），他还声称，尽管胡塞尔在方法论上的怀疑比笛卡尔更激进，但他还不够激进，因为他放弃对外部世界的存在判断本身就是一种存在判断。在这方面，洛斯基肯定，他自己对朴素实在论的批判性辩护实际上比胡塞尔的先验唯心主义更为激进。（弗雷德里克·特伦布莱）