The issue of whether the phenomenology presented in Ideen I was a metaphysical realism or an idealism came to the fore almost immediately upon its publication. The present essay is an examination of the relation of Gustav Shpet, one of Husserl’s students from the Göttingen years, to this issue via his understanding of phenomenology and, particularly, of the phenomenological reduction, as shown principally in his early published writings. For Shpet, phenomenology employs essential intuition without regard to experiential intuition. If we look on transcendental idealism as the label for this methodology, which disregards but does not deny either the empirical or its correlative species of intuition, then Shpet was such an idealist, all the while adhering to a metaphysical realism. In this way, Shpet could proclaim phenomenology to be the fundamental philosophical discipline without precluding the possibility of other philosophical disciplines insofar as they were conducted in relation to consciousness taken not as the “possession” of a human individual, but eidetically and thus not a “possession.”

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古斯塔夫·施佩特的内隐现象学唯心主义

Ideen I 中呈现的现象学是形而上学的现实主义还是唯心主义的问题几乎在其出版后立即浮出水面。本文是胡塞尔在哥廷根时期的学生之一古斯塔夫·施佩特 (Gustav Shpet) 通过对现象学的理解，尤其是对现象学还原的理解，考察了他与这个问题的关系，这主要体现在他早期发表的著作中。对于 Shpet 来说，现象学使用本质直觉而不考虑经验直觉。如果我们将先验唯心主义视为这种方法论的标签，它无视但不否认直觉的经验或其相关种类，那么施佩特就是这样的唯心主义者，始终坚持形而上学的实在论。这样，