The aim of this paper is twofold. The first is an interpretative one as I wish to provide a detailed account of Husserl’s conception of experiential justification. Here Ideas I and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 will be my main resources. My second aim is to demonstrate the currency and relevance of Husserl’s conception. This means two things: Firstly, I will show that in current debates in analytic epistemology there is a movement sharing with Husserl the basic idea that certain experiences gain their justificatory force simply from their distinctive phenomenal character. Secondly, I shall reveal the benefits of Husserl’s specific version of this view. Thus, one of my aims is to show that debates in current analytic epistemology could profit from adopting certain Husserlian elements. More precisely, I will defend Husserl’s claim that perceptual experiences are justifiers due to their self-giving phenomenal character as opposed to the currently popular view that it is the phenomenology of pushiness that makes them justifiers. To put it differently, what matters is what is originally given within experience and not how you feel about what is given.

中文翻译：

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胡塞尔的经验证明概念：它是什么以及它为何重要

本文的目的是双重的。第一个是解释性的，因为我希望详细说明胡塞尔的经验证明概念。这里的 Ideas I 和 Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge: Lectures 1906/07 将是我的主要资源。我的第二个目标是展示胡塞尔概念的流行性和相关性。这意味着两件事：首先，我将表明，在当前分析认识论的辩论中，有一种运动与胡塞尔分享基本思想，即某些经验仅从其独特的现象特征中获得其正当性力量。其次，我将揭示胡塞尔特定版本的这种观点的好处。因此，我的目标之一是表明当前分析认识论中的辩论可以从采用某些胡塞尔元素中受益。更确切地说，我将捍卫胡塞尔的主张，即知觉体验是辩解者，因为它们具有自我给予的现象特征，而不是当前流行的观点，即是咄咄逼人的现象学使它们成为辩解者。换句话说，重要的是在经验中最初被给予的东西，而不是你对所给予的东西的感受。