In the Logical Investigations, Husserl argues that “sign” is an ambiguous word because it refers to two essentially different signitive functions: indication and expression. Indications work in an evidential way, providing information through a direct association of the sign and the presence of an object or state of affairs. Expressions (when used to transmit knowledge) work in a non-evidential way, pointing to possible experiences and displaying that the speaker or someone else has had such experience. In this paper I show that Husserl went back to the distinction between indications and expressions in a much later text, a manuscript from 1931, in order to distinguish between two kinds of communication with different essential features. I call these indicative and expressive communication. My claim is that Husserl’s distinction between these two types of communication is a crucial contribution to the phenomenology of knowledge sharing. In knowledge sharing, we appropriate someone else’s knowledge as someone else’s knowledge. Husserl shows that only expressive communication, and not indicative communication, makes this appropriation possible. Since Husserl argues that only humans use expressive communication, his analysis of indicative and expressive communication is also a contribution to understanding the uniquely human capacity for accumulating knowledge.

中文翻译：

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胡塞尔关于逻辑研究中的交流和知识共享和 1931 年手稿

在《逻辑研究》中，胡塞尔认为“符号”是一个含糊不清的词，因为它指的是两个本质上不同的能指功能：指示和表达。指示以证据方式工作，通过标志与物体或事态的存在的直接关联来提供信息。表达（当用于传递知识时）以非证据方式工作，指出可能的经历并表明说话者或其他人已经有这样的经历。在这篇论文中，我展示了胡塞尔在更晚的文本（1931 年的手稿）中回到了指示和表达之间的区别，以区分具有不同本质特征的两种交流。我称之为指示性和表达性的交流。我的主张是胡塞尔对这两种传播方式的区分对知识共享现象学做出了重要贡献。在知识共享中，我们将别人的知识当作别人的知识来使用。胡塞尔表明，只有表达性的交流，而不是指示性的交流，才使这种挪用成为可能。由于胡塞尔认为只有人类使用表达性交流，他对指示性和表达性交流的分析也有助于理解人类积累知识的独特能力。使这种拨款成为可能。由于胡塞尔认为只有人类使用表达性交流，他对指示性和表达性交流的分析也有助于理解人类积累知识的独特能力。使这种拨款成为可能。由于胡塞尔认为只有人类使用表达性交流，他对指示性和表达性交流的分析也有助于理解人类积累知识的独特能力。