Whether Husserl is a conceptualist has been heatedly debated among contemporary Husserl scholars. The present article intends to join the debate by asking the question of how, in the Husserlian context, intuitive acts fulfill signitive ones. On the one hand, those who take Husserl to be a conceptualist hold the content-identity theory, arguing that intuitive act and signitive act have the same content, so that the former can fulfill the latter. On the other hand, the non-conceptualists defend the object-identity theory and claim that it is the identity of object of intuitive and signitive act that makes fulfillment possible. On the basis of a careful reading of the sixth investigation of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the article proposes a dynamic content-identity theory, in which the identity of content does not mean that intuitive act and signitive act have the identical content accidentally, but rather, in the dynamic fulfillment process, the intuitive act obtains the content that overflows into it from the signitive act, so that the two acts have the identical content. And this article shows how the dynamic content-identity theory places Husserl in the conceptualist camp while avoiding certain difficulties of either plain content-identity theory or object-identity theory.

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胡塞尔是概念主义者吗？重读胡塞尔的第六次逻辑考察

胡塞尔是否是一位概念主义者，在当代胡塞尔学者中引起了激烈的争论。本文旨在通过提出以下问题来加入辩论：在胡塞尔的语境中，直觉行为如何实现有意义的行为。一方面，以胡塞尔为概念主义者的人持有内容同一性理论，认为直观行为和意指行为具有相同的内容，因此前者可以满足后者。另一方面，非概念主义者为客体同一性理论辩护，并声称正是直觉和意义行为的客体同一性使实现成为可能。文章在仔细阅读胡塞尔《逻辑研究》第六篇考察的基础上，提出了动态内容同一性理论，其中内容的同一性并不意味着直觉行为和意指行为偶然具有相同的内容，而是在动态实现过程中，直觉行为获得了从意指行为溢出到其中的内容，从而使这两个行为具有相同的内容。并且本文展示了动态内容同一性理论如何将胡塞尔置于概念主义阵营，同时避免了普通内容同一性理论或对象同一性理论的某些困难。