Charles Travis has developed a distinction between “the historical” (the sensible world) and “the conceptual” (thoughts and concepts), which underlies his influential contributions to the philosophy of language and perception. The distinction is based on the observation that there are, for any thought, indefinitely many different circumstances that would render it true. The generality of thoughts and concepts contrasts with the particularity of the sensible world. I challenge the assumption that what exhibits such generality cannot belong to the sensible world. I also defend a version of the claim that perception involves the exercise of conceptual capacities.

中文翻译：

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查尔斯特拉维斯谈真相与知觉

查尔斯·特拉维斯（Charles Travis）对“历史”（可感世界）和“概念”（思想和概念）进行了区分，这是他对语言和感知哲学的重要贡献的基础。区别是基于这样的观察，即对于任何思想来说，有许多不同的情况可以使它成为真的。思想和概念的普遍性与感性世界的特殊性形成对比。我挑战这样一个假设，即表现出这种普遍性的东西不属于可感世界。我还捍卫了一种说法，即知觉涉及概念能力的运用。