De jure coreference in a discourse is typically understood as explicit coreference that speakers are required to recognize in order to count as having correctly understood the discourse. For example, in an utterance of the sentence ‘Tom went to the market because he needed soy milk’, the two underlined terms are typically coreferential in a way that appreciating their coreference is required to fully understand the utterance. Often, de jure coreference is understood as an equivalence relation, so in particular it is thought of as a transitive relation. However, Pinillos (Philos Stud 154(2):301–324, 2011) provides examples that apparently challenge the transitivity of de jure coreference (in intra-personal cases). In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, while it is (at best) inconclusive whether the relevant terms in Pinillos’s examples satisfy his third condition, it is much clearer that they fail to satisfy his first two conditions. Given that Pinillos’s conditions capture important characteristics of de jure coreference, his examples do not successfully show the non-transitivity of de jure coreference. Second, I present an alternative account of his examples, one that shows which representation the anaphoric pronoun in an example of the sort that he presents is de jure coreferential with.

中文翻译：

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法律上的共指的及物性：一个反对皮尼洛斯的案例

话语中的法律上的共同指称通常被理解为明确的共同指称，要求说话者识别以被视为正确理解了话语。例如，在句子“汤姆去市场，因为他需要豆奶”的话语中，这两个带下划线的术语通常是指称，需要欣赏它们的共同指称才能完全理解话语。通常，法律上的共指被理解为一种等价关系，因此它特别被认为是一种传递关系。然而，Pinillos（Philos Stud 154(2):301–324, 2011）提供的例子显然挑战了法理共指的传递性（在个人内部情况下）。在本文中，我论证了两个主张。第一的，尽管（充其量）Pinillos 示例中的相关术语是否满足他的第三个条件尚无定论，但更清楚的是，它们不满足他的前两个条件。鉴于 Pinillos 的条件捕捉到了法律上的共指的重要特征，他的例子并没有成功地显示出法律上的共指的非传递性。其次，我对他的例子提出了另一种解释，它表明在他所提出的那种例子中，照应代词在法律上与哪种表示法是指称的。