Why do we value higher-level scientific explanations if, ultimately, the world is physical? An attractive answer is that physical explanations often cite facts that don’t make a difference to the event in question. I claim that to properly develop this view we need to commit to a type of deterministic chance. And in doing so, we see the theoretical utility of deterministic chance, giving us reason to accept a package of views including deterministic chance.

中文翻译：

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差异化和确定性机会

如果最终世界是物理的，我们为什么要重视更高层次的科学解释？一个有吸引力的答案是物理解释经常引用对所讨论的事件没有影响的事实。我声称要正确地发展这种观点，我们需要致力于一种确定性的机会。在这样做的过程中，我们看到了确定性机会的理论效用，使我们有理由接受包括确定性机会在内的一系列观点。