In this paper, I argue that the fetishism objection to moral hedging fails. The objection rests on a reasons-responsiveness account of moral worth, according to which an action has moral worth only if the agent is responsive to moral reasons. However, by adopting a plausible theory of non-ideal moral reasons, one can endorse a reasons-responsiveness account of moral worth while maintaining that moral hedging is sometimes an appropriate response to moral uncertainty. Thus, the theory of moral worth upon which the fetishism objection relies does not, in fact, support that objection.

中文翻译：

---

道德对冲与原因应对

在本文中，我认为拜物教反对道德对冲是失败的。反对基于对道德价值的理性-反应性解释，根据该解释，只有当代理人对道德理性作出反应时，行动才具有道德价值。然而，通过采用非理想的道德理由的似是而非的理论，人们可以认可道德价值的理由反应性解释，同时坚持道德对冲有时是对道德不确定性的适当反应。因此，拜物教反对所依赖的道德价值理论实际上并不支持这种反对。