In a recent paper Lee Walters criticizes a number of philosophers – including Gundersen – for committing a ‘failure in the argumentative strategy’ when they attempt to amend the standard Lewis semantics for counterfactuals in order to avoid the so-called principle of Conjunction Conditionalization. In this article we defend a Gundersen-style probability-based semantics against Walter's major misgivings: that it is not logically conservative, that it is committed to the Connection Hypothesis, and that it cannot deal satisfactory with irrelevant semi-factuals.

中文翻译：

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为反事实的基于概率的语义辩护

在最近的一篇论文中，李沃尔特斯批评了许多哲学家——包括冈德森——在他们试图修改反事实的标准刘易斯语义以避免所谓的连词条件化原则时犯了“论证策略的失败”。在本文中，我们针对 Walter 的主要疑虑为 Gundersen 风格的基于概率的语义辩护：它在逻辑上并不保守，它致力于连接假设，并且它不能令人满意地处理不相关的半事实。