In the philosophical literature on the basis of moral equality, one conclusion achieves near consensus: that we must reject all Psychological Capacity Accounts. This widely held view crystallises around three objections. The first is the Arbitrariness Objection, which holds that the threshold at which the possession of the relevant capacities places an individual within the required range is arbitrary. The second is the Variations Objection, which holds that there is rational pressure to acknowledge that variations in psychological capacities between individuals are morally relevant. The third is the No Rational Agency Objection, according to which Psychological Capacity Accounts have unpalatable implications for our treatment of humans who do not possess the relevant capacities. We develop a Psychological Capacity Account based on the capacity for a conception of the good and offer a novel defence of the account against these objections.

中文翻译：

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拯救基本平等

在以道德平等为基础的哲学文献中，一个结论几乎达成共识：我们必须拒绝所有心理能力的解释。这种广泛持有的观点围绕着三个反对意见具体化。第一个是任意性反对意见，它认为拥有相关能力将个人置于所需范围内的阈值是任意的。第二个是变异反对意见，它认为存在理性压力来承认个体之间心理能力的差异在道德上是相关的。第三个是无理性代理反对意见，根据该反对意见，心理能力账户对我们对待不具备相关能力的人具有令人不快的影响。