Edgington has proposed a solution to the sorites paradox in terms of ‘verities’, which she defines as degrees of closeness to clear truth. Central to her solution is the assumption that verities are formally probabilities. She is silent on what verities might derive from and on why they should be probabilities. This paper places Edgington’s solution in the framework of a spatial approach to conceptualization, arguing that verities may be conceived of as deriving from how our concepts relate to each other. Building on work by Kamp and Partee, this paper further shows how verities, thus conceived of, may plausibly be assumed to have probabilistic structure. The new interpretation of verities is argued to also help answer the question of what the verities of indicative conditionals are, a question which Edgington leaves open. Finally, the question of how to accommodate higher-order vagueness, given this interpretation, is addressed.

中文翻译：

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什么真理可能是

Edgington 提出了一个用“真实性”来解决 sorites 悖论的解决方案，她将其定义为与明确真理的接近程度。她的解决方案的核心是假设真实性是形式上的概率。对于真实性可能来自什么以及为什么它们应该是概率，她保持沉默。本文将 Edgington 的解决方案置于概念化的空间方法框架中，认为可以将真实性视为源自我们的概念如何相互关联。本文以 Kamp 和 Partee 的工作为基础，进一步展示了如此构想的真实性如何被合理地假设为具有概率结构。对真实性的新解释也被认为有助于回答指示性条件的真实性是什么的问题，这是 Edgington 未解决的问题。最后，