Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have? To answer this question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is a more perspicuous way of reaping the same explanatory pay-off as pragmatic genealogy while dispensing with its fictionalising and historicising. My aim is to determine when and why the reverse movement from paradigm-based explanation to pragmatic genealogy remains warranted. I argue that the fictionalising and historicising of pragmatic genealogy is well-motivated, and I outline three ways in which the method earns its keep: by successfully handling historically inflected practices which paradigm-based explanation cannot handle; by revealing and arguing for connections to generic needs we might otherwise miss; and by providing comprehensive views of practices that place and relate the respects in which they serve both generic and local needs. ABSTRACT

中文翻译：

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从范式解释到语用系谱

如果对我们的概念实践的要点或功能感兴趣的哲学家可以直接关注我们现在拥有的实践的范例，他们为什么要费心去谱系解释呢？为了回答这个问题，我将爱德华·克雷格、伯纳德·威廉姆斯和米兰达·弗里克所倡导的实用谱系学方法——一种将虚构化和历史化的独特结合招致怀疑的方法——与更简单的基于范式的解释方法进行了比较。弗里克本人最近转向基于范式的解释，认为这是一种更明显的方式，可以获得与实用系谱相同的解释性回报，同时免除其虚构化和历史化。我的目标是确定何时以及为什么从基于范式的解释到实用的谱系学的反向运动仍然是有必要的。我认为语用系谱的虚构化和历史化是有充分动机的，并且我概述了该方法获得成功的三种方式：通过成功处理基于范式的解释无法处理的历史变化的实践；通过揭示和争论与一般需求的联系，我们可能会错过；并通过提供有关实践的全面观点，这些实践将它们服务于一般需求和本地需求的各个方面相关联。抽象的 并通过提供有关实践的全面观点，这些实践将它们服务于一般需求和本地需求的各个方面相关联。抽象的 并通过提供有关实践的全面观点，这些实践将它们服务于一般需求和本地需求的各个方面相关联。抽象的