Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our firstand higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your firstand higher-order attitudes, I show that you can’t be on the edge of the range, so there can’t be a range at all. Permissivism, in its traditional form, can’t be right. I consider new ways of developing Permissivism to avoid my argument, but they have problems of their own.

中文翻译：

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生活在边缘：反对认知宽容主义

认知宽容主义者面临一个关于我们的一阶态度和高级态度之间关系的特殊问题。他们声称，理性常常允许对证据做出一系列的信念式反应。鉴于关于您的一阶态度和高阶态度之间关系的合理假设，我表明您不能处于范围的边缘，因此根本不可能有范围。传统形式的宽容主义不可能是正确的。我考虑了发展 Permissivism 的新方法来避免我的论点，但它们有自己的问题。