This paper re-examines Kierkegaard's work with respect to the question whether truth is one or many. I argue that his famous distinction between objective and subjective truth is grounded in a unitary conception of truth as such: truth as self-coincidence. By explaining his use in this context of the term ‘redoubling’ [Fordoblelse], I show how Kierkegaard can intelligibly maintain that truth is neither one nor many, neither a simple unity nor a complex multiplicity. I further show how these points shed much-needed light on the relationship between objective and subjective truth, conceived not as different kinds or species of truth but as different ways in which truth manifests itself as a standard of success across different contexts of inquiry.

中文翻译：

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克尔凯郭尔论真理：一个还是多个？

本文重新审视了克尔凯郭尔关于真理是一个还是多个这个问题的工作。我认为，他对客观真理和主观真理的著名区分是建立在一个统一的真理概念之上的：真理是自洽的。通过解释他在“加倍”[Fordoblelse] 一词的上下文中的使用，我展示了克尔凯郭尔如何能够理解地坚持真理既不是一个也不是多个，既不是简单的统一体也不是复杂的多重性。我进一步展示了这些观点如何为客观真理和主观真理之间的关系提供了急需的启示，这些观点不是被视为不同种类或种类的真理，而是被视为真理在不同调查背景下作为成功标准表现出来的不同方式。