Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naive realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naive realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naive realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naive realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The effect is a middle-way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant: one which holds that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding.

中文翻译：

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康德短语中的朴素现实主义

二十世纪早期的知觉哲学家用反康德的术语表达了他们对知觉经验的天真的实在论观点。因为他们认为关于知觉经验的天真实在论与康德关于知觉必然包含在知觉意识中的方式的主张不相容。本文试图通过论证对视觉体验的朴素现实主义描述与理解必然涉及那些具有话语智力的理性存在者的感知体验的主张相容，从而将视觉体验的朴素现实主义描述置于可识别的康德框架内。这种效果是最近对康德的概念主义和非概念主义解释之间的一种中间方式：一种认为理解必然涉及我们，