Mill’s harm principle is commonly supposed to rest on a distinction between self-regarding conduct, which is not liable to interference, and other-regarding conduct, which is. As critics have noted, this distinction is difficult to draw. Furthermore, some of Mill’s own applications of the principle, such as his forbidding of slavery contracts, do not appear to fit with it. This article proposes that the selfregarding/other-regarding distinction is not in fact fundamental to Mill’s harm principle; what he should have said is that intervention is permissible only to prevent non-consensual harm, regardless of where it falls. This explains both why some otherregarding conduct is immune to interventions and why some self-regarding conduct can be interfered with.

中文翻译：

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重新制定 Mill 的危害原则

穆勒的损害原则通常被认为是基于对不受干扰的自利行为和不受干扰的其他行为之间的区别。正如评论家所指出的，这种区别很难区分。此外，穆勒自己对该原则的一些应用，例如他禁止奴隶制合同，似乎并不符合它。这篇文章提出，自我关注/他人关注的区别实际上并不是密尔伤害原则的基础；他应该说的是，干预只能是为了防止非自愿的伤害，无论伤害发生在何处。这既解释了为什么某些其他相关行为不受干预的影响，也解释了为什么某些自私行为可以受到干扰。