Agnes Taubert, and on Olga Plümacher, who emerges as a particularly forceful proponent of pessimism and, in my view, Hartmann’s best defender. While they are the major actors in this chapter, their sharpness of intellect and wit was directed against attacks by little-known philosophers and theologians such as Johannes Huber or Hugo Sommer and better-known neo-Kantian philosophers such as Wilhelm Windelband or Jürgen Meyer. Chapter 9 turns to “the heroic pessimist,” “the most radical pessimist,” who “alone was willing to take pessimism to its ultimate conclusion: suicide” (203, 201). Philipp Batz, or “Mainländer,” preached the “gospel . . . that salvation from the misery of life lies only in death, which is nothingness” (201). Chapter 10 lays out Julius Bahnsen’s worldview alongside exchanges with Hartmann. In my view, Bahnsen is the real radical pessimist. While Mainländer took the “ultimate” step in practice, this arguably provided a sort of redemption and peace that Bahnsen refused to allow. In Bahnsen’s view, “the essence of reality lies in the inner conflict of the will” (229); “reality itself is self-contradictory” (231). The best we could hope for is “some relief from all the suffering and tragedy of life,” particularly in “humor” (267). An unfortunate quirk of the book is that it lacks any overarching conclusion, ending simply with an assessment of Bahnsen as deserving “much greater attention” (284). I would have liked to see something more synthetic, something like the introduction, that could tie together the themes of the book and highlight their continuing relevance today. Overall, this is another excellent book by Beiser, unearthing another major, overlooked controversy in the history of philosophy, with a cast of insightful philosophers making arguments that deserve continued attention. Throughout, Beiser balances accessibility to non-specialists and substantive engagement with important secondary literature on Schopenhauer. He not only explains the views of the participants in this great philosophical drama, but inserts himself—and his readers—into that drama. He describes systems, arguments, and objections so richly that I often found myself interjecting my own thoughts about how one or another philosopher might respond to various objections. He shows how pessimism was part of other important philosophical controversies, among which I found particularly striking the near-drumbeat refrain of ongoing attempts to articulate a meaningful and secular philosophy of life: “Summa summarum, pessimism is the rediscovery of the problem of evil after the collapse of theism” (7). The need to develop a post-theistic philosophy of life persisted amongst all the philosophers—pessimist or not—in the book; this need helps crystallize the ongoing challenges for philosophers aware of the problem of evil, but unwilling to accept theistic resolutions to find meaning in life. P a t r i c k R . F r i e r s o n Whitman College

中文翻译：

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克尔凯郭尔和海德格尔的意义和死亡：存在主义死亡哲学的起源亚当·布本

Agnes Taubert 和 Olga Plümacher，他是悲观主义的特别有力的支持者，在我看来，他是哈特曼最好的防守者。虽然他们是本章的主要演员，但他们敏锐的智慧和机智是针对约翰内斯·胡贝尔或雨果·索默等鲜为人知的哲学家和神学家以及威廉·温德尔班德或于尔根·迈耶等知名新康德哲学家的攻击。第 9 章转向“英雄般的悲观主义者”，“最激进的悲观主义者”，他们“独自一人愿意将悲观主义推向最终结论：自杀”（203、201）。Philipp Batz，或“Mainländer”，宣讲“福音”。. . 从生命的痛苦中解脱出来的唯一方法是死亡，这是虚无”（201）。第 10 章展示了 Julius Bahnsen 的世界观以及与 Hartmann 的交流。在我看来，班森是真正的激进悲观主义者。虽然 Mainländer 在实践中采取了“最终”步骤，但这可以说提供了一种 Bahnsen 拒绝允许的救赎与和平。在班森看来，“现实的本质在于意志的内在冲突”（229）；“现实本身是自相矛盾的”（231）。我们所能希望的最好的事情是“从生活中的所有苦难和悲剧中得到一些解脱”，尤其是“幽默”（267）。这本书一个不幸的怪癖是它缺乏任何总体结论，结尾只是评价 Bahnsen 值得“更多关注”（284）。我希望看到一些更综合的东西，比如引言，可以将本书的主题联系在一起，并突出它们在今天的持续相关性。总的来说，这是Beiser的另一本优秀书，发掘了另一个专业，哲学史上被忽视的争论，一群有见地的哲学家提出了值得继续关注的论点。在整个过程中，Beiser 平衡了非专家的可访问性和与叔本华的重要二级文献的实质性参与。他不仅解释了这部伟大哲学剧中参与者的观点，而且将他自己——以及他的读者——插入了这部剧中。他如此丰富地描述了系统、论点和反对意见，以至于我经常发现自己会插入我自己的想法，关于一位或另一位哲学家可能会如何回应各种反对意见。他展示了悲观主义是如何成为其他重要哲学争论的一部分，其中我发现特别引人注目的是不断尝试阐明有意义和世俗的生活哲学的近乎鼓点的副歌：“Summa summarum，悲观主义是有神论崩溃后对邪恶问题的重新发现”（7）。本书中所有哲学家（无论是否悲观）都需要发展一种后有神论的生活哲学。这种需要有助于明确哲学家们面临的持续挑战，他们意识到邪恶的问题，但不愿接受有神论的解决方案来寻找生活的意义。帕特里克·R。弗里森惠特曼学院