abstract:Some claim that Kant's commitment to the explanatory priority of judgments over concepts is one of his most important contributions to the philosophy of mind. There is, however, extensive disagreement over the nature and extent of this commitment. Existing interpretations ignore a substantial body of textual evidence and offer no account of the origins of Kant's view. This paper corrects for these deficiencies. I explain, first, the relevant accounts of concept possession Kant encountered in the writings of his predecessors; and, second, how within this context he first expressed a commitment to the view that conceptual content is explanatorily dependent on acts of judgment. I then argue that Kant endorsed a second form of discursive primacy, namely, the view that every use of a concept in conscious thought about an object has the form of a judgment.

中文翻译：

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康德与第一批判之前的判断的首要性

摘要：有些人声称康德对判断优先于概念的解释的承诺是他对心灵哲学最重要的贡献之一。然而，对于这一承诺的性质和范围存在广泛的分歧。现有的解释忽略了大量的文本证据，也没有说明康德观点的起源。本文对这些不足进行了修正。我首先解释康德在其前辈著作中遇到的概念占有的相关叙述；其次，他如何在这种背景下首先表达了对概念内容在解释上依赖于判断行为的观点的承诺。然后我认为康德赞同第二种形式的话语首要性，即，