abstract:This paper explores the theory of freedom that Emilie du Châtelet advances in her essay "On Freedom." Using contemporary terminology, we can characterize this theory as a version of agent-causal compatibilism. More specifically, the theory has the following elements: (a) freedom consists in the power to act in accordance with one's choices, (b) freedom requires the ability to suspend desires and master passions, (c) freedom requires a power of self-motion in the agent, and (d) freedom is compatible with moral necessity but not with physical necessity. While these elements may at first appear disparate, the paper shows that they fit together quite well. The resulting theory is a surprising combination of doctrines that appear to be based on Samuel Clarke's libertarian account of free will and doctrines that are reminiscent of the compatibilist accounts of John Locke, Anthony Collins, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes.

中文翻译：

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Du Châtelet 关于自由、自我运动和道德必要性

摘要：本文探讨了 Emilie du Châtelet 在她的论文《论自由》中提出的自由理论。使用当代术语，我们可以将这一理论描述为代理-因果兼容性的一个版本。更具体地说，该理论具有以下要素：(a) 自由在于按照自己的选择行事的能力，(b) 自由需要有抑制欲望和控制激情的能力，(c) 自由需要一种自我控制的能力。行动者的运动，以及 (d) 自由与道德必要性相容，但与物理必然性不相容。虽然这些元素乍一看可能完全不同，但论文表明它们可以很好地结合在一起。由此产生的理论是一个令人惊讶的学说组合，这些学说似乎基于塞缪尔·克拉克'