abstract:I present a reading of Eudemian Ethics V.12/Nicomachean Ethics VI.12 according to which Aristotle argues for an executive account of φρόνησις (practical wisdom) to show why it is useful to possess this virtue. On this account, the practically wise person’s actions are expressive of his knowledge of the fine, a knowledge that only the practically wise person has. This is why he must not only be a good deliberator, but also δεινότης (cunning), able to execute his actions well. An important consequence of this reading is that the debate about whether Aristotle holds a Humean account of practical reason presupposes assumptions about the scope of rationality that Aristotle rejects.

中文翻译：

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亚里士多德行动中的理性：阅读 EE V.12/EN VI.12

摘要：我阅读了 Eudemian Ethics V.12/Nicomachean Ethics VI.12，亚里士多德据此论证了 φρόνησις（实践智慧）的执行说明，以说明为什么拥有这种美德是有用的。因此，实际智者的行为表达了他对罚款的了解，这种知识只有实际智者才有。这就是为什么他不仅要善于思考，还要δεινότης（狡猾），能够很好地执行自己的行动。这种解读的一个重要结果是，关于亚里士多德是否持有休谟式对实践理性的解释的争论，预设了亚里士多德拒绝接受的关于理性范围的假设。