Normative ethics asks: What makes right acts right? W. D. Ross attempted to answer this question in The Right and the Good (1930). Most theorists have agreed that Ross provided no systematic explanatory answers. Ross's intuitionism lacks any decision procedure, and, as McNaughton (2002: 91) states, it ‘turns out after all to have nothing general to say about the relative stringency of our basic duties’. Here I will show that my own Rossian intuitionism does have a systematic way of explaining what makes right acts right. Deontological theories have struggled to say what internal to acts could make them right. From Price to Ross, the striking but uninformative answer has been the nature of the act. In this paper I will provide a Rossian theory of the moral natures of acts. It contains a set of self-evident principles of moral stringency and other considerations that can assist agents in deciding what prima facie duty overrides what.

中文翻译：

---

道德行为的性质

规范伦理问：什么使正确的行为正确？WD Ross 试图在正义与善良（1930 年）。大多数理论家都同意罗斯没有提供系统的解释性答案。罗斯的直觉主义缺乏任何决策程序，而且，正如 McNaughton (2002: 91) 所说，“对于我们基本职责的相对严格性，它毕竟没有什么笼统的说法”。在这里，我将展示我自己的罗斯直觉主义确实有系统的方式来解释什么是正确的行为。道义论理论一直在努力说明行为的内在因素可以使它们正确。从普莱斯到罗斯，令人震惊但信息不足的答案是自然该法案的。在本文中，我将提供关于行为的道德性质的罗斯理论。它包含一套不言而喻的道德严格原则和其他考虑因素，可以帮助代理人决定什么表面上的义务凌驾于什么之上。