John Henry Newman was no Janeite. While there is evidence he read most or all of her novels, they did not entirely suit his taste: “everything Miss Austen writes is clever,” wrote Newman in an 1837 letter to his sister, “but I desiderate something. There is a want of body to the story. The action is frittered away in over-little things.... Miss Austen has no romance—none at all” (“Extract” 117). Jane Austen, in other words, was not enough like Walter Scott. And yet, while Newman preferred plots of a different scope and coloration, he and Austen had more in common than these lines might suggest. In particular, they shared a certain conception of narrative intelligence, understood in broadly Aristotelian terms. An 1821 book review by Richard Whately, admirer of Austen and soon-to-be mentor to Newman, nicely underscores some of the features of thought Newman would come to share with Austen: in it, Whately celebrates the realism of an Austen novel (“this Flemish painting”), suggesting that it arises from her adherence to “the general rules of probability” in the depiction of character. Because the actions and choices of her characters are intelligible in terms of probability, they strike the reader as realistic, or in accord with “human nature.” The result is that they “guide the judgment,” giving us a clearer view of the world, and furnishing “general rules of practical wisdom” (88). Now, Newman was only an occasional, amateur writer of novels, but his theoretical work in epistemology easily maps onto Whately’s description: at the heart of his view of human knowing was the way that something like Aristotelian prudence (“judgment,” or “practical wisdom”) discerns the truth about the character of things by means of probability. This is no coincidence, for it was Whately, beginning the year after his essay on Austen, who played a signal role in forming Newman’s epistemological sensibilities.1 It makes sense that the kind of practical intelligence on display in an Austen narrative should be the same kind of intelligence Newman theorized in many different works. The questions this essay seeks to address are: exactly how much do Austen and Newman have in common, and at the same time, where do they differ, and why? Newman, of course, as an Oxford scholar and public

中文翻译：

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一个可能的故事：纽曼和奥斯丁的性格和概率

约翰·亨利·纽曼（John Henry Newman）不是珍妮特人。尽管有证据表明他阅读了大部分或全部小说，但小说并不完全符合他的口味：“奥斯丁小姐写的一切都很聪明，”纽曼在1837年给姐姐的一封信中写道，“但我讨厌某些东西。这个故事缺少身体。动作因小事而荡然无存。...奥斯丁小姐毫无浪漫色彩-一点都不浪漫”（“摘录” 117）。换句话说，简·奥斯丁还不够沃尔特·斯科特（Walter Scott）。然而，尽管纽曼偏爱具有不同范围和颜色的地块，但他和奥斯丁的共同点却超出了这些线条所暗示的范围。特别是，他们分享了某种叙事智力的概念，这在亚里士多德式的术语中得到了广泛的理解。奥斯丁（Austen）的崇拜者，即将成为纽曼（Newman）的导师的理查德·怀特利（Richard Whately）在1821年撰写的书评，很好地强调了纽曼将要与奥斯丁分享的一些思想特征：在其中，Whately庆祝了奥斯丁小说（“这本佛兰德画”）的现实主义，暗示它源于她对“概率的一般规则”的坚持在人物描写中。因为她的角色的动作和选择在概率上是可理解的，所以它们使读者感到现实或符合“人性”。结果是他们“指导了判断”，使我们对世界有了更清晰的认识，并提供了“实践智慧的一般规则”（88）。现在，纽曼只是偶尔偶尔的小说作家，但是他在认识论上的理论工作很容易地映射到Whately的描述上：在他的人类认识的核心是像亚里士多德审慎（“审判，或“实践智慧”）通过概率来辨别事物性质的真相。这绝不是巧合，因为是在Whately发表于他的关于奥斯丁的论文的第二年起，他在形成纽曼的认识论敏感性方面发挥了信号作用。1有意义的是，在奥斯丁叙事中展示的实用情报应该是相同的纽曼（Newman）在许多不同的作品中都提出了一种智力理论。本文试图解决的问题是：奥斯丁和纽曼到底有多少共同点，同时又有何不同之处，为什么？纽曼当然是牛津大学的学者和公众 纽曼在形成纽曼的认识论敏感性中发挥了信号作用。1有意义的是，在奥斯丁叙事中展示的实用情报应该与纽曼在许多不同著作中理论化的情报一样。本文试图解决的问题是：奥斯丁和纽曼到底有多少共同点，同时又有何不同之处，为什么？纽曼当然是牛津大学的学者和公众 纽曼在形成纽曼的认识论敏感性中发挥了信号作用。1有意义的是，在奥斯丁叙事中展示的实用情报应该与纽曼在许多不同著作中理论化的情报一样。本文试图解决的问题是：奥斯丁和纽曼到底有多少共同点，同时又有何不同之处，为什么？纽曼当然是牛津大学的学者和公众