ABSTRACT

We run an experiment to test how consumers of banking services value stress tests performed by their banks. We query respondents about the extent to which they would be willing to trade profitability if banks conduct stress tests, maybe for greater bank financial stability. Our paper connects and innovates in the banking literature by providing empirical evidence of the value of communicating bank stress tests routines to the public from the consumer perspective rather than the regulator’s usual perspective or of the bank itself. By performing stress tests and communicating them to their customers, we find that consumers accept lower remuneration rates of their deposits, suggesting they value stress testing. Our experimental design also contains several queries to estimate the degree of financial literacy of respondents. By combining both perspectives, we find that respondents with higher financial literacy levels are more conservative and replace more profitable banks with less profitable banks that perform and communicate stress testing routines to the public. We explicitly consider measurement error in our data collection process of respondents’ rather subjective financial literacy indicator by introducing external instruments. Such consideration aims at mitigating attenuation bias. We also run several robustness tests with subsets of our sample and non-linear models, such as Probit.

摘要

我们进行了一项实验，以测试银行服务的消费者如何评价银行进行的压力测试。我们询问受访者，如果银行进行压力测试，他们愿意在多大程度上交易盈利能力，也许是为了提高银行的金融稳定性。我们的论文通过提供经验证据证明从消费者的角度而不是监管机构的通常角度或银行本身向公众传达银行压力测试程序的价值，从而在银行业文献中进行了连接和创新。通过进行压力测试并将其传达给客户，我们发现消费者接受较低的存款报酬率，这表明他们重视压力测试。我们的实验设计还包含几个查询来估计受访者的金融知识程度。通过结合这两种观点，我们发现金融知识水平较高的受访者更加保守，他们会用利润较低的银行取代利润更高的银行，这些银行执行并向公众传达压力测试程序。我们通过引入外部工具明确考虑了受访者相当主观的金融知识指标的数据收集过程中的测量误差。这种考虑旨在减轻衰减偏差。我们还使用我们的样本子集和非线性模型（例如 Probit）运行了几个稳健性测试。我们通过引入外部工具明确考虑了受访者相当主观的金融知识指标的数据收集过程中的测量误差。这种考虑旨在减轻衰减偏差。我们还使用我们的样本子集和非线性模型（例如 Probit）运行了几个稳健性测试。我们通过引入外部工具明确考虑了受访者相当主观的金融知识指标的数据收集过程中的测量误差。这种考虑旨在减轻衰减偏差。我们还使用我们的样本子集和非线性模型（例如 Probit）运行了几个稳健性测试。