Bruce Wardhaugh, Competition, Effects and Predictability: Rule of Law and the Economic Approach to Competition, Oxford: Hart, 2020, 272 pp, hb £70.00

Competition law scholarship tends to be preoccupied with questions of substance. ‘More’ or ‘less’ intervention? Contentment or concern with concentrated markets? Which business practices should be prohibited? These are key issues with significant consequences for enforcement. But the substantive reach of competition law – the ‘what’ we prohibit – cannot be divorced from questions of the legal form of market intervention – ‘how’ we determine legality. At what likelihood of harm do we adopt a presumption of illegality for a practice? When an anticompetitive impact is more likely than not? Solely when convinced that it is harmful in every circumstance, for fear of condemning efficient conduct? Alternatively, if we can only be sure that a practice is anticompetitive following individualised, context‐specific analysis of its economic consequences, should commercial uncertainty, the risk of errors, and scarce resources suggest that it isn't worth the hassle?

Competition, Effects and Predictability by Bruce Wardhaugh is notable for directly addressing questions of legal form in competition enforcement. Its novelty derives from a strong emphasis upon the formal rule of law. To those unfamiliar with European competition scholarship, such ‘novelty’ – and indeed responses to the title of this article – may seem banal. But that really isn't the case.

Scholarly appreciation for realising the formal rule of law in EU competition enforcement has been marginal since the 1960s, owing to a near consensus that effects‐based, ad hoc determinations of legality constitute the economically optimal form of market intervention. In 1967 René Joliet criticised the fledging European regime for adopting generalised presumptions, bluntly delineating the boundary between legality and illegality.11 R. Joliet, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law: American, German and Common Market Laws in Comparative Perspective (Liège: Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège, 1967) 117. Sophisticated enforcement required ‘a thorough factual analysis, on a case‐by‐case basis, in the light of economic investigation’, thereby accurately prohibiting the ‘bad’ and permitting the ‘good’.22 ibid, 190. This set the tone for decades. Some question the need for competition law to be predictable.33 For example I. Forrester, ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy: Compatibility, Efficiency, Legal Security’ in C. Ehlermann and I. Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 102‐103. Others have advocated determining the legality of business conduct through context‐specific economic analysis of its competitive effect,44 For example V. Korah, ‘EEC Competition Policy – Legal Form or Economic Efficiency’ (1986) 39 CLP 85, 92‐93. thereby undermining aspirations towards a system of clear and generalised obligations.55 The exception is the presumptive illegality of cartels. This has been especially pronounced in scholarship critical of EU law on abuses of market dominance.66 For example Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, ‘An Economic Approach to Article 82’ 2‐6 at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf (last visited 3 December 2020). Other imperfect generalisations intended to foster legal certainty – block exemption regulations,77 For example S. Bishop, ‘Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Article 81 and 82’ in Ehlermann and Atanasiu, n 3 above, 56. indicative enforcement guidelines88 For example P. Akman, ‘‘Consumer Welfare’ and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric’ (2009) 32 World Competition 71, 78. –have also been dismissed as formalistic ‘pigeon‐holing’,99 See D. Hay, ‘Pigeonholes in Antitrust’ (1984) 29 Antitrust Bulletin 133. ignoring the actual economic consequences of the conduct in question.

Resistance to this consensus on the appropriate form of competition law is difficult to pinpoint in European scholarship before the mid‐2000s.1010 For example R. Whish and B. Sufrin, ‘Article 85 and the Rule of Reason’ (1987) 7 YEL 1, 37. But in the last 15 years this has started to change. Several scholars have challenged the notion that realising generalised, predictable norms, and economically sophisticated enforcement are mutually exclusive. Sometimes labelled a ‘Neo’‐Chicago approach, they advocate the incorporation of economic learning into the design of presumptions and structured tests, thereby aiming to reconcile accurate economic outcomes with approximating the formal rule of law.1111 For example D. Evans and J. Padilla, ‘Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo‐Chicago Approach’ (2005) 72 U Chicago LR 73; A. Christiansen and W. Kerber, ‘Competition Policy with Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules Vs Rule of Reason”’ (2006) 2 JCLE 215; Y. Katsoulacos and D. Ulph, ‘On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy: A General Welfare‐Based Analysis’ (2009) 57 Journal of Industrial Economics 410.

Competition, Effects and Predictability contributes to this debate. Wardhaugh's overall argument is that an ‘effects‐based approach’ to determining legality ‘is a threat to the rule of law’ (2). Following an account of how both competition law in the US (Chapter 2) and EU (Chapter 3) have increasingly favoured this means for determining legality, Wardhaugh ultimately adopts a solution akin to the ‘Neo’‐Chicagoans of incorporating economic learning into the ex ante design of presumptions and structured tests (11‐12, 211–212, 222).1212 However unlike ‘Neo’‐Chicagoans, Wardhaugh advocates including non‐economic goals when designing legal tests (212). In this way, competition enforcement can be economically informed and foster legal certainty for businesses.

Competition, Effects and Predictability has much promise as the first monograph‐length analysis of the formal rule of law in competition law. The significance of the ideal tends to be underdeveloped in this field, limiting its conceptual clout in contemporary debates on the form of market intervention. Wardhaugh had the opportunity to offer a clarion call for fellow advocates of the formal rule of law in competition enforcement, providing a persuasive articulation of why it matters, anchoring other scholarship critical of the formal consensus. It could also have caused those advocating case‐by‐case, effects‐based determinations of legality to directly address the consequences of their preferred form of market intervention.

Competition, Effects and Predictability fails to realise this potential. Unfortunately, it does so in a way that is arguably more damaging for those of us who sympathise with Wardhaugh's aim of re‐emphasising the rule of law in competition circles. The problem is that the argument of the book falls at the first hurdle: Competition, Effects and Predictability doesn't offer a compelling account of why any reader, ally or adversary, should care about the formal rule of law in competition enforcement. Wardhaugh's account of ‘The Rule of Law and Why it Matters’ (Chapter 1) is so underwhelming that it is incapable of sustaining analysis of the ideal's alleged demise for the rest of the book. After hinting that the origins of the concept lie in attempts to constrain centralised power (16‐17), such justificatory beginnings are quickly abandoned as ‘not our task’ (17). Wardhaugh is correct that ethereal jurisprudential discussions of the rule of law are easily dismissed as a lawyerly fetish in a field animated by economic goals in real‐world markets (14). But that does not mean that one must choose political or economic justifications for the formal rule of law in competition enforcement.

In any event, Wardhaugh advances neither for around 20 pages. The reader is instead offered a basic account of the formal conceptualisation of the rule of law through a listing of desiderata proposed by Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz (18‐19). Occasional references are made to predictability, guiding legal subjects, and avoiding arbitrary decision‐making (18‐21), but no sustained attempt is made to convince the reader of their importance. If anything, Wardhaugh's lukewarm allusions to any ‘pros’ makes his explicit consideration of the ‘cons’ hit even harder: the ideal upon which he grounds Competition, Effects and Predictability is compatible with ‘even the most abhorrent regimes’ (21) and coheres with ‘laws that are bad or wrong or even evil in content’ (22). Although Wardhaugh ultimately accepts that substantive interpretations are too broad (24‐27), the damage to the formal account has already been done.

His next step is to demonstrate that the formal rule of law is valued by the USA and EU legal orders, occasionally being mentioned in judicial decisions (27‐35). Again, a justification for why it should be considered important in competition law is absent; this is unfortunate given reference to the is/ought fallacy immediately beforehand (26).

The final substantive section of the chapter is titled ‘Why the Rule of Law Matters’. Although reiterating that convincing competition commentators will require a robust economic justification, Wardhaugh instead offers a paragraph on New Institutional Economics (36), recognition that ‘the rule of law’ is a World Bank development indicator (37‐38), acknowledgement that international investment treaties attempt to stabilise the regulatory environment (38‐39), and brief reflections on uncertainty as a transaction cost (40).

Is that all there is? Is that what commentators in competition circles are defending or disregarding? A concept of murky liberal origins, purely concerned with legal certainty but without clear justification, compatible with evil but occasionally mentioned by judges, and included within investment relations and pseudo‐scientific development indicators? No wonder concern for the formal rule of law has been drowned out by a push towards effects‐based analysis; even those sympathetic to Wardhaugh's argument will finish the chapter wondering whether the formal rule of law ideal is worth fighting for in competition law.

The main purpose of this piece is to achieve what Wardhaugh does not: to argue why competition lawyers should care about the formal rule of law. To effectively scrutinise individualised, effects‐based determinations of legality and to advocate a more balanced reconciliation of accurate outcomes with realising the formal rule of law, a compelling articulation of what is at stake is necessary. In failing to explain its value within this specific context of economically animated market interventions, concerns about the appropriate form of competition law can easily be dismissed as stereotypical lawyerly qualms. This article will articulate the political and economic significance of the formal rule of law in competition policy.

This is not to say that with stronger foundations Competition, Effects and Predictability would be free from problems. Having built his theory around the importance of legal certainty, Wardhaugh's subsequent embrace of behavioural economics may be difficult to reconcile with the assumption of rationality underpinning the formal rule of law. Furthermore, the exclusive focus upon predictability is too narrow: the equal application of generalised laws is almost entirely absent from consideration; and Wardhaugh's criticism of courts misses their importance for dynamically approximating the formal rule of law, thereby making the ideal more achievable. For the formal rule of law to be taken seriously in competition scholarship, it is critical that such inconsistencies and omissions are avoided.

Bruce Wardhaugh，竞争，影响与可预测性：法治和竞争的经济方法，牛津：哈特，2020，272 pp，hb£70.00

竞争法奖学金往往侧重于实质性问题。“更多”或“更少”的干预？对集中市场是否满意或担忧？应禁止哪些商业行为？这些是关键问题，会对执法产生重大影响。但是，竞争法的实质范围（我们禁止的是“什么”）不能脱离法律形式的问题市场干预的概念-我们如何确定合法性。我们将非法行为推定为何种损害可能性？什么时候更有可能产生反竞争影响？仅仅因为害怕谴责有效行为而确信在每种情况下都是有害的吗？或者，如果我们只能根据针对其经济后果的个性化，针对特定情况的分析来确定某项实践具有反竞争性，那么商业不确定性，错误风险和稀缺资源是否应该表明这样做值得您避免麻烦呢？

Bruce Wardhaugh撰写的《竞争，影响和可预测性》以直接解决竞争执法中的法律形式问题而著称。它的新颖性源于对形式法治的高度重视。对于那些不熟悉欧洲竞争奖学金的人来说，这种“新颖性”（实际上是对本文标题的回应）似乎是平庸的。但是事实并非如此。

自1960年代以来，学术界对于在欧盟竞争执法中实现正式法治的赞赏微乎其微，这是由于人们几乎达成共识，即基于效果的临时性合法性决定构成了市场干预的经济最佳形式。1967年，勒内·朱丽叶（RenéJoliet）批评了刚刚起步的欧洲政权采用普遍化的推定，直率地划定了合法性与非法性之间的界限。11 R. Joliet，《反托拉斯法中的合理规则：比较视角下的美国，德国和共同市场法》（列日：列日大学法学院，1967年）117。 复杂的执法需要“根据经济调查，逐案进行全面的事实分析”，从而准确地禁止“不良”并允许“良好”。22同上，190。这为数十年来定下了基调。有人质疑竞争法的可预测性是否必要。33例如，I。Forrester，C。Ehlermann和I. Atanasiu（eds）撰写的“欧共体反托拉斯政策的现代化：兼容性，效率，法律安全”，《 2000年欧洲竞争法：欧共体反托拉斯政策的现代化（牛津：哈特） ，2001）102-103。 其他人则主张通过针对其竞争效果的针对具体环境的经济分析来确定商业行为的合法性，44例如V. Korah，“ EEC竞争政策–法律形式或经济效率”（1986）39 CLP 85，92-93。 从而破坏了建立明确和广义义务制度的愿望。55例外是卡特尔的推定非法。 这在批评欧盟关于滥用市场支配地位的法律的奖学金中尤为明显。66例如，竞争政策经济咨询组，“第82条的经济方法” 2-6，位于http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf（最后访问2020年12月3日）。 其他旨在促进法律确定性的不完善概括-大块豁免条例，77例如，S。Bishop，Ehlermann和Atanasiu的“实施第81条和第82条的规则的现代化”，上述第3页，第56页。 指示性执行准则88例如P.Akman的《消费者福利》和第82EC条：《实践与修辞》（2009年）32世界竞赛71、78 。 –也被视为形式主义的“鸽子洞”，99见D.Hay，``反托拉斯中的漏洞''（1984）29反托拉斯公告133。 忽略了有关行为的实际经济后果。

在2000年代中期之前，很难在欧洲学者中明确指出反对这种关于适当形式的竞争法的共识。1010例如，R。Whish和B. Sufrin，“第85条和理性规则”（1987年），7 YEL 1，37。但是在过去的15年中，这种情况已经开始改变。一些学者对以下概念提出了挑战：实现通用的，可预测的规范和经济上复杂的强制执行是互斥的。他们有时被称为“新芝加哥策略”，他们主张将经济学习纳入推定和结构化测试的设计中，从而旨在通过近似正式的法治来调和准确的经济结果。1111例如，D。Evans和J. Padilla，“设计用于评估单边实践的反托拉斯规则：一种新芝加哥方法”（2005）72 U Chicago LR 73。A.克里斯琴森和W.克贝尔，“用最理想的区分规则而不是‘竞争政策本身违法（2006年）2 JCLE 215理性的规则还是规则’”; Y.Katsoulacos和D.Ulph，``关于竞争政策的最佳法律标准：基于一般福利的分析''（2009年）57 《工业经济学杂志》 410。

竞争，影响和可预测性助长了这场辩论。Wardhaugh的整体论点是，确定合法性的“基于效果的方法”“是对法治的威胁”（2）。考虑到美国（第2章）和欧盟（第3章）的竞争法都越来越喜欢这种确定合法性的方法，沃达夫最终采用了类似于“新”-芝加哥的解决方案，将经济学习纳入前假设和结构化测试的事前设计（11-12，211-212，222）.1212但是，与“新”芝加哥人不同，瓦尔多（Wardhaugh）提倡在设计法律测试时包括非经济目标（212）。通过这种方式，可以从经济上告知竞争执法人员，并为企业树立法律确定性。

竞争，效果和可预测性作为竞争法中正式形式法治的第一个专着篇幅的分析，具有很大的前景。理想的意义在该领域往往未得到充分发展，从而限制了其在市场干预形式的当代辩论中的概念影响力。Wardhaugh借此机会向竞争执法中正式法治的倡导者们发出了号角呼吁，就其为何如此重要提供了有说服力的表述，并锚定了其他对正式共识持批评态度的奖学金。这也可能促使那些主张基于案例，基于效果的合法性确定直接解决其偏爱的市场干预形式的后果。

竞争，影响和可预测性未能实现这一潜力。不幸的是，这样做确实对我们那些同情瓦尔达在竞争圈中重新强调法治的目标的人来说更具破坏性。问题在于这本书的论据首先遇到障碍：竞争，影响和可预测性没有提供令人信服的说明，为什么任何盟友或对手都应该在竞争执法中关注正式的法治。Wardhaugh对“法治及其重要性”的论述（第1章）是如此令人难以理解，以至于无法在本书的其余部分中对理想的所谓灭亡进行持续的分析。在暗示这一概念的起源在于试图限制中央集权（16-17）之后，这种辩解性的开端被迅速抛弃为“不是我们的任务”（17）。Wardhaugh的观点是正确的，因为在现实世界市场中以经济目标为动力的领域，对法治的空谈法理学的讨论很容易被视为一种法律上的恋物癖而被驳回（14）。但这并不意味着一个人必须选择政治或政治手段。 竞争执法中正式法治的经济依据。

无论如何，Wardhaugh都不前进约20页。相反，通过朗·富勒（Lon Fuller）和约瑟夫·拉兹（Joseph Raz）（18-19）提出的愿望清单，向读者提供了法治形式化概念的基本说明。偶尔提到可预测性，指导法律主题并避免任意决策（18-21），但并没有持续尝试使读者相信它们的重要性。如果有的话，沃达夫对任何“利弊”的冷淡暗示使他对“利弊”的明确考虑更加困难：他基于竞争，影响和可预测性的理想与“即使是最可憎的政体”相兼容（21），并与“在内容上是坏，错误，甚至是邪恶的法律”相一致（22）。尽管沃达夫最终接受了实质性的解释过于宽泛（24-27），但是对正式账户的损害已经造成了。

他的下一步是证明正式的法治受到美国和欧盟法律命令的重视，在司法裁决中偶尔会提及（27-35）。再次，没有理由说明为什么在竞争法中应将其视为重要。不幸的是，考虑到事先要提到的is / ought谬误（26）。

本章最后一个实质性部分的标题是“为什么法治很重要”。尽管沃达夫重申说服竞争评论员需要有力的经济理由，但他提供了一段关于新制度经济学的文章（36），承认“法治”是世界银行的发展指标（37-38），承认国际投资条约试图稳定监管环境（38-39），并简要思考不确定性作为交易成本（40）。

就是这些吗？这是竞争圈中的哪些评论员在捍卫或漠视？一个模糊的自由派起源的概念，纯粹与法律确定性有关，但没有明确的理由，与邪恶兼容，但法官偶尔提到，并包含在投资关系和伪科学发展指标之内？难怪对基于效果的分析的推动使对正式法治的关注被淹没了。甚至那些同情沃达（Wardhaugh）观点的人也将在本章中结束，想知道形式法治理想是否值得在竞争法中争取。

这件作品的主要目的是实现沃达夫没有的目的：争辩为什么竞争律师应该关心正式的法治。为了有效地审查基于效果的个性化确定，并主张在实现正式法治的情况下更加准确地平衡准确的结果，有必要明确说明风险所在。如果不能在这种经济活跃的市场干预的特定背景下解释其价值，就可以轻易地将对竞争法的适当形式的关注视为陈规定型的律师资格而消除。本文将阐明竞争法中正式法治的政治和经济意义。

这并不是说有了更坚实的基础，竞争，效果和可预测性将毫无问题。在围绕法律确定性的重要性建立了他的理论之后，沃达夫随后对行为经济学的拥护可能很难与作为正式法治基础的理性假设相协调。此外，对可预测性的排他性过于狭窄：几乎完全没有考虑到一般性法律的平等适用。Wardhaugh对法院的批评错过了它们对于动态逼近形式法治的重要性，从而使理想更加容易实现。为了在比赛奖学金中认真对待正式的法治，至关重要的是要避免这种不一致和遗漏。