There is a growing interest in the phenomenon of co-predication, where a single NP appears with predicates that have incompatible selectional preferences. The phenomenon suggests that a single NP can stand for at least two entities and so that the truth-conditions of a co-predicative sentence are more complicated than what the surface structure indicates. In this paper, two different kinds of proposals concerning this issue are presented and discussed: conservative approaches that commit to there being just one entity that is referred by a co-predicative term; and non-conservative, but more intuitive approaches, that assign conjunctions of simple truth-conditional contents to co-predicative sentences. Meanwhile, it is argued that, although much is still unknown about co-predication, many approaches coincide in signalling that the different senses of the terms that co-predicate in a stable way are linked by particular metaphysical relations.

对共同谓词现象的兴趣与日俱增，其中单个NP与选择偏好不兼容的谓词一起出现。这种现象表明，单个NP可以代表至少两个实体，因此，共同谓词的真实条件要比表面结构所指示的条件更为复杂。在本文中，提出并讨论了关于该问题的两种不同类型的建议：保守的方法，承诺只有一个实体被共同谓词所引用；以及非保守但更直观的方法，它们将简单的真实条件条件内容的连词分配给共同谓词。同时，有观点认为，尽管关于共同预测的很多知识仍然未知，