We examine the role of delegation in predicting CEO successions. Using a novel proxy for delegation in mergers and acquisitions, we find that overall CEO turnover rates are about one third higher following deals where the CEO delegates to a senior manager versus deals with no observable delegation. The delegation-turnover relation is strongest when deals are delegated to heirs apparent, the CEO is older, or the delegation decision is unexpected. Voluntary turnovers are more frequent following delegated deals than non-delegated deals, consistent with delegation signaling an orderly succession. The delegation-turnover relation fades over time while other predictors of turnover such as profitability, CEO age, and the presence of an heir apparent in the corporate hierarchy continue to remain significant up to five years after the deal. Our findings suggest that delegation is unique among our predictors of turnover in the sense that it captures near term orderly successions.

我们研究了授权在预测CEO继任过程中的作用。通过使用新颖的代理进行并购代理，我们发现，在执行CEO委派给高级经理的交易之后，与没有可观察到的委派的交易相比，CEO的总体离职率要高出大约三分之一。当将交易委派给明显的继承人，CEO年龄较大或委派的决定出乎意料时，委派与周转关系最强。委托交易后的自愿性周转比非委托交易更频繁，这与授权表明有序的继任相吻合。委托人与营业额的关系随着时间的流逝而逐渐消失，而其他营业额的预测指标（如盈利能力，CEO年龄和继承人在公司层级中的存在）在交易达成后的五年内仍将继续保持重要地位。