Accounting for ambiguity aversion in dynamic decisions generally implies that either dynamic consistency or consequentialism must be given up. To gain insight into which of these principles better describes people’s preferences, we tested them using a variation of Ellsberg’s three-color urn experiment. Subjects were asked to make a choice both before and after they received a signal. We found that most ambiguity neutral subjects satisfied both dynamic consistency and consequentialism and behaved consistent with subjective expected utility with Bayesian updating. The majority of ambiguity averse subjects satisfied consequentialism, but violated dynamic consistency.

考虑到动态决策中的歧义厌恶通常意味着必须放弃动态一致性或结果主义。为了深入了解其中哪些原则可以更好地描述人们的喜好，我们使用Ellsberg的三色实验对它们进行了测试。要求受试者在收到信号之前和之后做出选择。我们发现，大多数歧义中立的主题都满足动态一致性和结果性，并且表现出与贝叶斯更新相一致的主观预期效用。大部分歧义厌恶的对象都满足结果主义，但违反了动态一致性。