The discussion of the debate on the two approaches to Husserl’s phenomenology and of the debate between David Carr and Dan Zahavi on the paradox of subjectivity signify a fundamental problem: What is the relationship between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world? For this problem, I argue that subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world are Co-originary in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, in the sense of their structural necessity. I define this co-originary relationship from the perspective of unification of constitution and givenness—this unification establishes their equiprimordial relationship. According to this co-originariness, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world are not three isolated and independent origins, but are interdependent and absolute origins of sense of being in their own right. In sum, this essay proposes that transcendental co-originariness can be recognized as another way of reading Husserl’s phenomenology.

关于胡塞尔现象学的两种方法的辩论以及戴维·卡尔和丹·扎哈维之间关于主观性悖论的辩论的讨论提出了一个基本问题：主观性，主体间性与世界之间的关系是什么？对于这个问题，我认为主观性，主体间性和世界是胡塞尔的先验现象学的共同起源，就其结构的必要性而言。我从宪法和赋予性的统一的角度来定义这种共同起源的关系，这种统一建立了它们的等初关系。根据这种共同起源性，主观性，主体间性和世界不是三个孤立和独立的起源，而是相互依存和绝对意义上的存在感。总共，