A lacuna in the extant literature and our desire to contribute to the theoretical literature on how tax/subsidy policies can be used by regions to attract the creative class together provide the motivation for this paper. The paper’s basic contribution is that it is the first to theoretically analyze competition between two regions (1 and 2) for mobile creative capital, the key attribute possessed by the creative class. Both regions produce a final good using creative and physical capital. In the first case, physical capital is immobile and only region 2 uses tax policy to attract the mobile creative capital. We compute the equilibrium returns to creative and physical capital, we specify a key condition for creative capital in the aggregate economy, and we show which of three tax policies gives region 2 the highest income. In the second case, creative and physical capital are mobile and both regions pursue tax policies to attract mobile creative capital. Once again, we compute the equilibrium returns to creative and physical capital and then describe the optimal taxes for the two regions given that they wish to maximize regional income.

现有文献中的空白以及我们希望为有关地区可以如何使用税收/补贴政策吸引创意阶层的理论文献做出贡献，为本文提供了动力。本文的基本贡献是，它是第一个从理论上分析两个区域（1和2）之间的移动竞争创意资本，创意阶层拥有的关键属性。这两个地区都利用创造力和物质资本来产生最终产品。在第一种情况下，实物资本是固定的，只有区域2使用税收政策吸引流动的创意资本。我们计算创意和实物资本的均衡收益，为总体经济中的创意资本指定一个关键条件，并显示三种税收政策中的哪一项可以使地区2的收入最高。在第二种情况下，创意资本和实物资本是流动性的，两个地区都实行税收政策以吸引流动性创意资本。再次，我们计算创造力和实物资本的均衡收益，然后描述这两个地区的最佳税收，因为它们希望最大化地区收入。