Why do some leaders respect constitutional provisions like presidential term limits, while others do not? For all regimes, constitutions are important reference texts that provide some basic rules of the game. Within this framework, term limits and electoral laws are crucial because they are directly concerned with the exercise of power. Using Geddes’ regime typology, this article is proposing a regime-oriented approach to explain the variation on the African continent. Democracies, party-based regimes, and military regimes are surely different from each other, but they have a degree of depersonalisation in common that is not found in personalist regimes. For the latter type, term limits are a question of regime survival. Personalist rulers will therefore seek to amend or ignore constitutions, but their success will depend on the cohesion of their ruling coalition. The argument will be illustrated with two case studies: Togo and Tanzania.

为什么有些领导人尊重诸如总统任期限制之类的宪法规定，而另一些则不这样做呢？对于所有政权而言，宪法都是重要的参考书，提供了一些基本的游戏规则。在这个框架内，任期限制和选举法至关重要，因为它们直接关系到权力的行使。本文使用Geddes政权类型学，提出了一种以政权为导向的方法来解释非洲大陆的变化。民主制，基于政党的政权和军事政权固然彼此不同，但是它们具有一定程度的去个性化，这在个人主义政权中是没有的。对于后一种类型，任期限制是政权生存的问题。因此，个人主义统治者将寻求修改或忽略宪法，但其成功将取决于其执政联盟的凝聚力。该论点将通过两个案例研究加以说明：多哥和坦桑尼亚。