Besides the introduction of multi-party elections, the sub-Saharan wave of democratic reforms of the 1990s encompassed the introduction of limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve. Executive term limits (ETLs) are key for democracy to advance in a continent with a legacy of personal rule. However, the manipulation of ETLs has become a recurring mode of autocratisation, through which African aspiring over-stayers weaken executive constraints, taint political competition, and limit citizens’ possibility to choose who governs. This article presents a three-phase model of autocratisation by ETL manipulation and, using new data, offers one of the first regional comparative studies of ETL manipulation in sub-Saharan Africa that rests on econometric modelling. The analysis leads to revisiting some previous findings on the drivers of ETL manipulation and highlights the relevance of other previously underestimated factors that may either discourage a leader from challenging ETLs or prevent their successful manipulation.

除了实行多党选举外，1990年代撒哈拉以南的民主改革浪潮还包括对行政首长可以任职的任期数量进行限制。执行任期限制（ETL）是民主在拥有个人统治传统的非洲大陆发展的关键。但是，对ETL的操纵已成为一种反复出现的专制化模式，通过这种方式，非洲有抱负的逾期居留者削弱了行政约束，污染了政治竞争，并限制了公民选择谁来执政的可能性。本文介绍了一种通过ETL操纵进行专制化的三阶段模型，并使用新数据提供了基于计量经济学建模的撒哈拉以南非洲地区ETL操纵的首批区域比较研究之一。