This paper draws on agency theory, as extended by the social theory of agency (STA) (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia, 2012), to examine the association between governance arrangements, reliance on government funding, chief executive officer (CEO) non-profit experience, and CEO compensation in the UK charity sector. We rely on a hand-collected data for the largest 240 charities and find that greater trustee board diversity (specifically gender and education diversity) and the existence of a remuneration or nomination committee are positively associated to CEO compensation. The results also show that a reliance on government funding and CEO's non-profit work experience, together with the presence of a finance/accounting expert on the audit committee are negatively associated to CEO compensation. The existence of an audit committee, internal audit function, use of specialist external auditor and CEO characteristics (gender, ethnicity and managerial experience) are not significant factors. Our findings are largely consistent with the STA's propositions. Specifically, executive compensation levels reflect the CEO's ability to work with a diverse board while a higher reliance on government funding signals the role of the State's pressures in moderating CEO compensation. Finally, in a context characterised by altruism and public benefit, financial rewards are not seen as the dominant ‘value metric’, resulting in lower compensation for CEOs previously working in the sector. Our findings have policy implications, specifically in relation to the role, composition and effectiveness of governance structures (e.g., trustee boards, audit and remuneration committees) in overseeing the design of executive compensation schemes within the charity sector.

中文翻译：

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治理、政府资金和首席执行官特征在多大程度上影响英国慈善机构的高管薪酬？代理社会理论的见解

本文借鉴代理社会理论 (STA) 扩展的代理理论（Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez & Gomez-Mejia, 2012），研究治理安排、对政府资金的依赖、首席执行官 (CEO ) 非盈利经验，以及英国慈善部门的 CEO 薪酬。我们依靠为最大的 240 家慈善机构手动收集的数据，发现更大的受托人董事会多元化（特别是性别和教育多元化）以及薪酬或提名委员会的存在与 CEO 薪酬呈正相关。结果还表明，对政府资金的依赖和 CEO 的非营利工作经验，以及审计委员会中财务/会计专家的存在与 CEO 薪酬呈负相关。审计委员会的存在，内部审计职能、使用专业外部审计师和 CEO 特征（性别、种族和管理经验）不是重要因素。我们的发现与 STA 的主张基本一致。具体而言，高管薪酬水平反映了 CEO 与多元化董事会合作的能力，而对政府资金的更高依赖表明了国家压力在调节 CEO 薪酬方面的作用。最后，在以利他主义和公共利益为特征的背景下，经济奖励不被视为主要的“价值衡量标准”，导致以前在该行业工作的 CEO 的薪酬较低。我们的研究结果具有政策意义，特别是与治理结构（例如，受托人委员会、