One of the most familiar ideas in the domain of normative inquiry is the thought that normative principles should be able to guide us—or, more generally, that that the normative is action-guiding. In ethics, guidance has often been appealed to in order to defend subjective, as opposed to objective theories, subjective theories often being explicitly characterized in terms of guidance. For instance, classical utilitarianism has been thought by many to fail disastrously on the guidance front. Epistemologists have likewise invoked guidance, most often to criticize various externalist norms and theories. Almost all parties to these disputes agree that normative guidance requires epistemic access to a domain of facts: in order to be guided by a normative principle, one must have access to whether the conditions specified by the principle apply, and in order to be guided by a normative reason, one must have access to the reason itself. And herein lies the problem: guidance ambitions, many have argued, are doomed, for there is no domain of facts that we can invariably access. This is the Access Problem for guidance. If this is right, then it looks like there simply are no principles or norms that we are always in a position to be guided by in the desired way, though there might be a different, weaker kind of guidance that even more externalist or objectivist norms can provide. If the normative is actionguiding, then we are forced to draw the grim conclusion that there is no such thing. If normativity is to be salvaged, we must, it seems, settle for less and tone down our guidance ambitions. I won’t here reiterate so-called anti-luminosity arguments attempting to show that there are no nontrivial luminous conditions, conditions such that whenever they obtain, we are in a position to know this. (I do, however, revisit the structure of anti-luminosity reasoning below.) My focus will be on a class of views that at first sight seem to fully sidestep such arguments, evading the Access Problem altogether. One might concede that the project of identifying some domain of facts that we purportedly always have access to is doomed to fail. In particular, views that internalize the facts grounding normative

中文翻译：

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指导、认知过滤器和非偶然行为

规范性探究领域最熟悉的想法之一是，规范性原则应该能够指导我们——或者更一般地说，规范性是行动指导。在伦理学中，经常诉诸指导以捍卫主观理论，而不是客观理论，主观理论通常在指导方面具有明确的特征。例如，许多人认为古典功利主义在指导方面失败了。认识论者也同样援引了指导，最常见的是批评各种外在主义规范和理论。几乎所有这些争议的当事方都同意规范性指导需要对事实领域的认知访问：为了受到规范性原则的指导，人们必须了解该原则规定的条件是否适用，为了受到规范性理由的指导，人们必须能够接触到理由本身。这就是问题所在：许多人认为，指导野心注定要失败，因为没有我们可以始终访问的事实领域。这是指导的访问问题。如果这是对的，那么似乎根本就没有原则或规范可以让我们始终以期望的方式受到指导，尽管可能有一种不同的、较弱的指导，甚至更外在主义或客观主义的规范可以提供。如果规范是行动指导，那么我们就被迫得出没有这样的东西的严峻结论。如果要挽救规范性，我们似乎必须满足于减少并降低我们的指导野心。我不会在这里重申所谓的反光度论点，试图表明不存在非平凡的光度条件，只要它们获得条件，我们就可以知道这一点。（但是，我确实会在下面重新审视反光度推理的结构。）我的重点将放在一类观点上，这些观点乍一看似乎完全回避了这些论点，完全回避了访问问题。人们可能会承认，识别我们声称总是可以访问的某些事实领域的项目注定要失败。特别是，将基于规范的事实内化的观点 ) 我的重点将放在一类观点上，乍一看似乎完全回避了这些论点，完全回避了访问问题。人们可能会承认，识别我们声称总是可以访问的某些事实领域的项目注定要失败。特别是，将基于规范的事实内化的观点 ) 我的重点将放在一类观点上，乍一看似乎完全回避了这些论点，完全回避了访问问题。人们可能会承认，识别我们声称总是可以访问的某些事实领域的项目注定要失败。特别是，将基于规范的事实内化的观点