This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.

中文翻译：

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知识第一功能主义

本文有两个目的。第一个是至关重要的：我确定了一套规范信念的规范要求，我认为突出的知识第一观点很难满足它们。其次，我认为我更喜欢的观点，知识优先功能主义，在规范的基础上比它现存的竞争对手更可取。这种解释将认识论正当化的信念视为由正确运作的认知过程产生的信念，这些认知过程以产生知识作为其认知功能。