There has been an ongoing debate about whether desires are beliefs. Call the claim that they are the desire-as-belief thesis (DAB). This paper sets out to impugn the two versions of DAB that have enjoyed the most support in the philosophical literature: the guise of the good and the guise of reasons accounts. According to the guise of the good version of DAB, the desire to j is identical to the belief that j is good. According to the guise of reasons version of DAB, the desire to j is identical to the belief that one has a normative reason to j. My paper presents a pair of objections to DAB: the first specifically targets the guise of reasons account defended by Alex Gregory, while the second aims to undermine DAB more generally.

中文翻译：

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欲望是关于规范理由的信念吗？

关于欲望是否是信念一直存在争论。称它们是“欲望即信念论点”(DAB) 的说法。本文旨在抨击在哲学文献中获得最多支持的两个版本的 DAB：善的伪装和理由帐户的伪装。根据 DAB 的好版本的幌子，对 j 的渴望与相信 j 是好的是相同的。根据 DAB 的理由版本的伪装，对 j 的渴望与相信人们对 j 有规范的理由是相同的。我的论文提出了对 DAB 的两个反对意见：第一个专门针对 Alex Gregory 辩护的借口，而第二个旨在更广泛地破坏 DAB。