A considerable amount of attention has been directed to the animal/human distinction in recent years, but there remains a fundamentally productive, if unsettling ambiguity within the distinction itself. The distinction operationalizes a generalized skepticism about other minds. This essay argues that Stanley Cavell’s account of acknowledgment, once appropriately considered and modified so as to include animal minds within its purview, can allow for the navigation and negotiation of the distinction in question without either collapsing the human into the animal entirely or lionizing the human as such. Accordingly, the essay advocates for a reclamation and reconsideration of the creaturely as a category and a condition within which dwell the subjects of skepticism. In order to do this the essay intervenes in a number of areas simultaneously, including reflections on animality and skepticism in the short fiction of Franz Kafka, the species problem in the philosophy of biology, the relational status of companionate animals, and the theoretical biology of Jakob von Uexkull.

中文翻译：

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生物条件：卡夫卡、卡维尔和 Uexküll 中的承认和动物性

近年来，人们对动物/人类的区别给予了相当多的关注，但这种区别本身仍然存在着一种根本上富有成效但令人不安的模糊性。这种区别体现了对其他思想的普遍怀疑。这篇文章认为，斯坦利·卡维尔 (Stanley Cavell) 对承认的描述，一旦经过适当考虑和修改以将动物思想纳入其权限范围内，就可以允许导航和协商所讨论的区别，而不会将人类完全折叠为动物或将人类视为狮子。因此。因此，本文主张将受造物作为一个范畴和一种条件，在其中居住怀疑论的主题，进行回收和重新考虑。为了做到这一点，本文同时介入了多个领域，