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Fanciful Poetics and Skeptical Epistemology in Margaret Cavendish's Poems and Fancies
Studies in Philology ( IF 0.2 ) Pub Date : 2018-01-01 , DOI: 10.1353/sip.2018.0029
Jessie Hock

Abstract:The first publication of the prolific and unorthodox early modern writer Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) versifies the atomist underpinnings of the cosmos in imitation of Lucretius's great first-century BCE atomist poem, De rerum natura. However, soon after the publication of the 1653 Poems and Fancies, Cavendish claimed to have "Wave[d] the opinion of Atoms." Following her cue, critics have generally either ignored or maligned the atomist poems, downgrading the status of Lucretianism and poetry alike in the Cavendish corpus. In this article, I argue that although Cavendish does abandon the idea that inanimate particles constitute the fundamental structure of matter, she never forswears the fanciful Lucretian epistemology she develops in Poems and Fancies. Closely attuned to the intersection between epistemological skepticism and poetic bravado in De rerum natura, Cavendish's atomist poetry amplifies the elements of Lucretian atomism that bring it into conversation with skepticism. Agreeing with Lucretius that nature's inner truths are fundamentally unknowable, Cavendish establishes fancy as a legitimate speculative practice. By pitting her fanciful poetics against scientific methodologies that make claims to truth, Cavendish establishes ignorance as a defensible epistemological posture. Her manipulation of gender stereotypes in her showy modesty and ostentatious professions of flightiness and ignorance is essential to this goal. She subverts the conventional modesty topoi that are so central to early modern women's writing in order to establish epistemological modesty—skepticism—as the hallmark of genuine natural philosophy.

中文翻译:

玛格丽特·卡文迪许的诗歌和幻想中的幻想诗学和怀疑论认识论

摘要:多产且非正统的早期现代作家玛格丽特·卡文迪什(Margaret Cavendish,1623–1673年)的第一版模仿了卢克修蒂斯(Lucretius)一世纪伟大的BCE原子论诗《德·鲁鲁姆·纳图拉(De rerum natura)》,模仿了宇宙的原子论基础。但是,在1653年的《诗与幻想》出版之后不久,卡文迪许声称自己拥有“波(d)对原子的看法”。遵循她的暗示,评论家们通常忽略或破坏了原子主义诗歌,从而降低了卡文迪许语料库中的Lucretianism和诗歌地位。在本文中,我认为尽管卡文迪许(Cavendish)确实放弃了无生命的粒子构成物质的基本结构的观点,但她从未放弃过她在《诗与幻想》中发展出来的奇特的卢克塞斯认识论。卡文迪许的原子论诗歌与认识论怀疑论和诗意夸张论之间的交汇点密切相关,他的原子论诗歌放大了卢克雷斯蒂亚原子论的元素,使之与怀疑论进行了对话。卡文迪许同意卢克修蒂乌斯(Lucretius)的本质内在本质是不可知的,因此将幻想确立为合法的投机行为。卡文迪什通过将自己虚幻的诗学与主张真理的科学方法论相提并论,将无知确立为一种可辩驳的认识论姿态。她在轻浮的谦虚和夸张的轻浮和无知的职业中对性别刻板印象的处理对于这个目标至关重要。她颠覆了传统的谦虚礼节,这些礼节对早期现代女性来说至关重要
更新日期:2018-01-01
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