In his Principles of Geology (1830–33), Charles Lyell seeks to explain the processes by which the great geological monuments of the world – from mountains to river valleys – came to be as they are. Through his theory of uniformitarianism, which states that geological phenomena must be explained according to known and observable causes, Lyell develops in his Principles a narrative explaining the laws governing such phenomena. But because the processes of geological flux he seeks to describe cannot be observed in their totality, Lyell frequently appeals to the imagination to ford the many gaps in physical evidence. This article explores how Lyell's theory of uniformitarianism is built upon an original act of imaginative retrieval in which the geologist exercises mastery over the past through his imaginative reconstruction of prehistory, where “history” is understood to mean “belonging to human time.” I argue that in his careful delineation of the means by which the mind may come to know what is not necessarily verifiable, Lyell appeals to a principle of the imagination that closely resembles Samuel Taylor Coleridge's concept of the vital and generative power of the secondary imagination. Furthermore, I highlight Coleridge's own failure, in his reading of Lyell, to recognize this resemblance between the geologist's imaginative act and his own – a failure that led him to privilege the catastrophist theories that Lyell set out to (and indeed did) supplant.

中文翻译：

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查尔斯·莱尔的地质想象力

查尔斯·莱尔（Charles Lyell）在他的《地质学原理》（1830-33年）中试图解释世界上伟大的地质古迹-从山脉到河谷-的形成过程。通过他的均等主义理论，该理论指出必须根据已知和可观察的原因来解释地质现象，赖尔在其《原理》中发展了一种叙事方式来解释支配这种现象的规律。但是由于无法完全观察到他试图描述的地质通量过程，因此莱尔经常呼吁人们进行想象，以弥补物理证据方面的许多空白。本文探讨了莱尔的均等主义理论是如何建立在想象力恢复的原始行为上的，在该行为中，地质学家通过对想象力的史前重建，对过去进行了掌握，“历史”被理解为“属于人类时间”。我辩称，赖尔在仔细描述人的大脑可能知道什么不一定可以验证的方法时，诉诸于想象力原理，该原理与塞缪尔·泰勒·科尔里奇关于次要想象力的生命力和生成力的概念非常相似。此外，在他对莱尔的阅读中，我强调了科尔里奇自己的失败，即他未能认识到地质学家的想象力行为与他自己的行为之间的相似之处–这一失败使他享有赖尔提出的（并且确实确实）取代了灾难理论的特权。莱尔诉诸于想象力原理，该原理与塞缪尔·泰勒·科尔里奇关于次要想象力的生命力和产生力的概念极为相似。此外，在他对莱尔的阅读中，我强调了科尔里奇自己的失败，即他未能认识到地质学家的想象力行为与他自己的行为之间的相似之处–这一失败使他享有赖尔提出的（并且确实确实）取代了灾难理论的特权。莱尔诉诸于想象的原理，该原理非常类似于塞缪尔·泰勒·科尔里奇关于次要想象力的生命力和产生力的概念。此外，在他对莱尔的阅读中，我强调了科尔里奇自己的失败，即他未能认识到地质学家的想象力行为与他自己的行为之间的相似之处–这一失败使他享有赖尔提出的（并且确实确实）取代了灾难理论的特权。