In the last paragraphs of Freud's essay on the paranoid Dr. Schreber, there is discussion of what Freud considers a "striking similarity" between Schreber's persecutory delusion and Freud's own theory. Freud was indeed later to generalize, famously, that "the delusions of paranoiacs have an unpalatable external similarity and internal kinship to the systems of our philosophers"--among whom he included himself.(1) For all his characteristic slyness, it may be true that the putative congruence between paranoia and theory was unpalatable to Freud. In the hands of subsequent thinkers, however, it has by now become less an embarrassment than a prescriptive article of faith: for literary and cultural critics, the prevailing theoretical challenge has been to find ever more subtle and searching ways of implementing a hermeneutic of suspicion. In a world where no one need be delusional to find evidence of systemic oppression, to theorize out of anything but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naive or complaisant. Even aside from the prestige that now attaches to a hermeneutic of suspicion in critical theory as a whole, queer studies in particular has had a distinctive history of intimacy with the paranoid imperative. Freud, of course, traced every instance of paranoia to the repression of same-sex desire, whether in women or in men. A chain of powerful, against-the-grain responses to Freud's argument, beginning with Guy Hocquenghem's Homosexual Desire, has established the paranoid stance as a uniquely privileged one for understanding not--as in the Freudian tradition--homosexuality itself, but rather precisely the mechanisms of homophobic and heterosexist enforcement against it.(2) Subversive and demystifying parody, suspicious archaeologies of the present, the detection of hidden patterns of violence and their exposure: these infinitely doable and teachable protocols of unveiling have become the common currency of cultural and historicist studies, and signs in turn of the special status that queer and antihomophobic inquiry seems to hold within that movement. If there is any obvious danger in the triumphalism of a hermeneutic of suspicion. it is that the broad consensual sweep of such methodological assumptions, the current near-profession-wide agreement about what constitutes narrative or explanation or adequate historicization, may, if it persists unquestioned, unintentionally impoverish the gene-pool of literary-critical perspectives and skills. The trouble with a narrow gene-pool, of course, is its diminished ability to respond to environmental (for instance, political) change. Another danger of the present paranoid consensus, however, is that it may require the disarticulation, disavowal, and misrecognition of other ways of reading--ways less oriented around suspicion--that are actually being practiced. One premise of the present collection is that a closer, more respectful attention to past and present queer reading practices--the kind of attention these essays, in their different ways, all embody--will show how the reservoir of practices already in use crucially exceeds the theorizations of a consensual hermeneutic of suspicion. Many of these essays are, rightly, incisive and unerring in their methodical suspicion; but what more unites them is a very different impulse and history, which would be badly misrecognized under the currently available rubrics. Perhaps instead of battening on the Freudian understanding of paranoia, for all its useful definitional linkage to homoerotic issues, it would be more descriptive here to use Melanie Klein's less differentiated, arguably less elegant concept of the paranoid position. The interest of Klein's concept lies, it seems to me, in her seeing the paranoid position always in the oscillatory context of a very different possible one, the depressive/reparative position.(3) For Klein's infant or adult, the paranoid position--understandably marked by hatred, envy, and anxiety--is a position of terrible alertness to the dangers posed by hateful and envious part-objects that one cannot help but ingest from the world around one. …

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简介：比小说更酷

在弗洛伊德关于偏执狂施雷伯博士的文章的最后几段中，讨论了弗洛伊德认为施雷伯的被害妄想与弗洛伊德自己的理论之间“惊人的相似之处”。弗洛伊德确实后来著名地概括为“偏执狂的妄想与我们哲学家的系统有着令人不快的外在相似性和内在亲缘关系”——他也包括他自己。(1) 尽管他的所有特征性的狡猾，这可能是偏执狂和理论之间的假定一致性对弗洛伊德来说是真实的。然而，在后来的思想家手中，它现在已不再是一种尴尬，而是一种规定性的信条：对于文学和文化评论家来说，普遍存在的理论挑战是找到更加微妙和探索性的方法来实施怀疑的解释学。在一个没有人需要妄想找到系统性压迫的证据的世界里，除了偏执的批评立场之外，从任何东西中进行理论化已经显得天真或自满。除了现在在整个批判理论中与怀疑的解释学相关的声望之外，特别是酷儿研究在与偏执命令的亲密关系方面有着独特的历史。当然，弗洛伊德将每一个偏执的例子都追溯到对同性欲望的压抑，无论是女性还是男性。对弗洛伊德的论点的一系列强有力的、反常规的回应，从盖伊·霍昆格姆的同性恋欲望开始，已经确立了偏执的立场，作为一种独特的特权立场，而不是像弗洛伊德的传统那样理解同性恋本身，而是准确地理解同性恋和异性恋对它的强制执行机制。 (2) 颠覆性和神秘化的模仿，可疑的考古学目前，发现隐藏的暴力模式及其暴露：这些无限可行和可教的揭幕协议已成为文化和历史主义研究的共同货币，并反过来表明酷儿和反同性恋调查似乎在其中持有的特殊地位移动。如果怀疑的解释学的胜利主义存在任何明显的危险。正是这种方法论假设的广泛共识，目前关于什么构成叙述或解释或充分的历史化的近乎全行业的共识，如果它毫无疑问地持续存在，可能会无意中使文学批评观点和技能的基因库变得贫乏。当然，基因库狭窄的问题在于它对环境（例如政治）变化的反应能力减弱。然而，目前偏执的共识的另一个危险是，它可能需要对其他正在实践的阅读方式——较少以怀疑为导向的方式——进行脱节、否认和误认。本系列的一个前提是更密切、更尊重地关注过去和现在的酷儿阅读实践——这些文章以不同的方式关注，所有体现——将展示已经在使用的实践库如何关键地超越了怀疑的共识解释学的理论。这些文章中有许多在他们有条不紊的怀疑中理所当然地精辟而无误。但让他们更团结的是一种非常不同的冲动和历史，在当前可用的标题下，这将被严重误解。也许与其坚持弗洛伊德对偏执狂的理解，尽管其与同性恋问题的所有定义联系都很有用，但在这里使用梅兰妮·克莱因（Melanie Klein）的偏执位置的差异较小、可以说不那么优雅的概念会更具描述性。在我看来，克莱因的概念的兴趣在于，她总是在一种非常不同的可能的振荡背景下看到偏执的位置，即抑郁/修复位置。(3) 对于克莱因的婴儿或成人来说，偏执的位置——可以理解地以仇恨、嫉妒和焦虑为特征——是一种对仇恨和嫉妒的部分对象所带来的危险非常警觉的位置，人们不得不从世界围绕一个。…