The purpose of this article is to critically review the provision of section 48 (2) (d) of the Zimbabwean Constitution from a gendered perspective. Section 48 (2) (d) of the Constitution would seem to have abolished death penalty for women but retained the same for men. Given Zimbabwe’s commitment to gender equality and respect for human dignity, this article argues that the disparity in the treatment of women and men under this section is not only inconsistent with the notion of gender equality and substantive equality, but also fails to comply with the rules of justifying the adoption of remedial measures. It is recommended that a better approach by the Constitution would be to abolish death penalty in its totality for both men and women. 1 . Introduction The Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 has been applauded for some of its important provisions including for the first time, the inclusion of socioeconomic rights as justiciable rights. By explicitly recognizing socioeconomic rights as justiciable rights, Zimbabwe has joined the other countries in Africa such as South Africa and Kenya that have accorded these sets of rights equal status with civil and political rights as enforceable rights in their constitutions. The Constitution explicitly recognizes rights relating to housing, health, and education. In addition, the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe has been commended for its gendersensitive approach and commitments to gender equality. In this regard, the Constitution differs from the former Constitution by jettisoning the ‘claw back’ provision, which made the provisions of gender equality subject to customary law and practice. Section 23 of the previous Constitution provided that the recognition of gender equality will only apply, subject to existing customary law and practice. In interpreting this provision, the Zimbabwean Supreme Court had ruled in Magaya v. Magaya1 that section 23 of the Constitution will not apply to customary personal law such as inheritance. In that case, the bone of contention was whether a daughter of a deceased could inherit from his estate under customary law. The Supreme Court had rigidly interpreted section 23 of the then Constitution by holding that the primogeniture customary law of inheritance was neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional. The coming into force of this 1 [1999] ICHRL 14 (16 February 1999).

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对 2013 年津巴布韦宪法第 48 (2) (d) 条的性别分析

本文的目的是从性别角度批判性地审查津巴布韦宪法第 48 (2) (d) 条的规定。《宪法》第 48 (2) (d) 条似乎废除了对女性的死刑，但对男性则保持不变。鉴于津巴布韦对性别平等和尊重人的尊严的承诺，本文认为本节规定的男女待遇差异不仅不符合性别平等和实质性平等的概念，而且不符合规则。证明采取补救措施的合理性。建议宪法更好的方法是彻底废除男女死刑。1 . 引言 2013 年津巴布韦宪法因其一些重要条款而受到称赞，其中包括首次将社会经济权利作为可审理的权利。通过明确承认社会经济权利是可审理的权利，津巴布韦加入了南非和肯尼亚等非洲其他国家的行列，这些国家在其宪法中赋予这些权利与公民和政治权利同等的地位，作为可执行的权利。宪法明确承认与住房、健康和教育有关的权利。此外，津巴布韦 2013 年宪法因其对性别问题敏感的方法和对性别平等的承诺而受到赞扬。在这方面，宪法与前宪法的不同之处在于摒弃了“回爪”条款，这使得性别平等的条款受制于习惯法和惯例。前《宪法》第 23 条规定，承认性别平等仅适用于现有习惯法和惯例。在解释这一规定时，津巴布韦最高法院在 Magaya 诉 Magaya1 案中裁定，《宪法》第 23 条不适用于继承等习惯属人法。在这种情况下，争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。前《宪法》第 23 条规定，承认性别平等仅适用于现有习惯法和惯例。在解释这一规定时，津巴布韦最高法院在 Magaya 诉 Magaya1 案中裁定，《宪法》第 23 条不适用于继承等习惯属人法。在这种情况下，争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。前《宪法》第 23 条规定，承认性别平等仅适用于现有习惯法和惯例。在解释这一规定时，津巴布韦最高法院在 Magaya 诉 Magaya1 案中裁定，《宪法》第 23 条不适用于继承等习惯属人法。在这种情况下，争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。受现有习惯法和惯例的约束。在解释这一规定时，津巴布韦最高法院在 Magaya 诉 Magaya1 案中裁定，《宪法》第 23 条不适用于继承等习惯属人法。在这种情况下，争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。受现有习惯法和惯例的约束。在解释这一规定时，津巴布韦最高法院在 Magaya 诉 Magaya1 案中裁定，《宪法》第 23 条不适用于继承等习惯属人法。在这种情况下，争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。争论的焦点是死者的女儿是否可以根据习惯法继承其遗产。最高法院严格解释了当时的宪法第 23 条，认为长子继承习惯法既不歧视也不违宪。本 1 [1999] ICHRL 14（1999 年 2 月 16 日）生效。