Statutory interpretation involves an interpreter determining the meaning of the text on the basis of various interpretive tools, all of which relate to the meaning of the words and their composition in light of the relevant context. Recently, with the increasing availability of scientific research tools such as corpus linguistics, advocates of such methods have stressed that statutory interpretation is an “empirical” inquiry. These claims fail to appreciate the contribution that context makes to meaning, both within and outside of law. Determinants of legal meaning must all relate in some way to the context of the relevant statute, whether the connection is to its language or the circumstances surrounding its enactment. Courts give (sometimes conclusive) weight to the statutory text, which implicates the systematicities of language and constrains the interpretations available to judges. Nevertheless, the ineliminably contextual nature of language, along with such legal features as the necessity of framing the interpretive inquiry in terms of an idealized interpreter, reveal legal interpretation to be a discretionary process, which should negate any claim that the determination of the meaning of a statute is primarily, or even largely, an empirical issue.

中文翻译：

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普通意义与经验主义

法定解释涉及解释者在各种解释工具的基础上确定文本的含义，所有这些都与根据相关上下文的单词含义及其组成有关。最近，随着语料库语言学等科学研究工具的日益普及，此类方法的倡导者强调，法定解释是一种“经验”调查。这些主张没有意识到上下文对法律内外的意义的贡献。法律含义的决定因素都必须以某种方式与相关法规的上下文相关，无论是与其语言的联系还是与其颁布的环境有关。法院对法定文本给予（有时是决定性的）权重，这牵涉到语言的系统性并限制了法官可用的解释。然而，语言的不可逾越的语境性质，以及诸如需要根据理想化的解释者来构建解释性探究的必要性等法律特征，揭示了法律解释是一个自由裁量的过程，这应该否定任何主张一项法规主要，甚至主要是一个经验问题。