Most of the law which the courts are called on to apply is statutory. Yet statutory interpretation languishes as a subject of study. For the most part, law students are expected to pick it up by a sort of process of osmosis. It’s more fun and engaging to study cases, as vignettes of real life. So the common law and common law method wins out. However, in many ways modern statutory interpretation has become closer to common law method. By common law method I mean the familiar process of extrapolation of underlying principles and values from disparate sources, with a view to identifying the particular rule to apply to the case in hand. In the last 40 years or so, the courts have used this sort of method in their approach to statutory interpretation both more widely and with increasing depth of effect. The words of a statute are taken as the starting point for analysis, rather than the start and finish. In some respects, they are not even the starting point, because the court goes through a process of orientation by reference to the context and subject matter of the statute to set a framework within which the words are to be read. Nonetheless, for the courts the words continue to be of critical importance. The final outcome has to be compatible with the language used and it controls the exercise of interpretation, even if often only in a relatively loose sense. How should one understand this process? To speak of a modern approach to statutory interpretation involves some sense of mutation over time. Why use the word “modern” if the approach is timeless and unvarying? In fact, standards and styles of statutory interpretation clearly do change over time. Neil Duxbury in his book Elements of Legislation1 provides a helpful guide here. What he brings out is the way in which the courts’ attitude to interpretation of legislation varies with conceptions of the relative constitutional roles of judges and the legislature. This in turn reflects shifts in judicial understanding of the political principles which underlie the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Statutory interpretation is embedded in constitutional law, and constitutional law has undergone a process of change in the last 40 years or so. Whereas Laws J (as he then was) could write in an important judgment of 1998 that “the common law does not generally speak in the language of constitutional rights”2, we now regularly use the concept of fundamental common law rights3 and even the idea of common law constitutionalism, whatever that may mean for different writers. In medieval times, statutes were treated as being in effect part of the common law. They were like judgments of a high court, to be woven into the

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现代法定解释

法院被要求适用的大部分法律都是成文法。然而，法定解释作为一个研究课题而萎靡不振。在大多数情况下，法学院的学生应该通过某种渗透过程来掌握它。作为现实生活的小插曲，研究案例更加有趣和引人入胜。所以普通法和普通法方法胜出。然而，在许多方面，现代法定解释已变得更接近普通法方法。我所说的普通法方法是指从不同来源推断基本原则和价值观的熟悉过程，以期确定适用于手头案件的特定规则。在过去 40 年左右的时间里，法院在其对法定解释的方法中更广泛地使用了这种方法，并且影响的深度也越来越大。以法规的文字作为分析的起点，而不是起点和终点。在某些方面，它们甚至都不是起点，因为法院通过参考法规的上下文和主题来设定一个框架来阅读这些词，这是一个定位过程。尽管如此，对于法院来说，这些词仍然至关重要。最终结果必须与所使用的语言兼容，并且它控制着解释的执行，即使通常只是在相对宽松的意义上。应该如何理解这一过程？谈论对法定解释的现代方法涉及随时间变化的某种意义上的变化。如果方法是永恒不变的，为什么要使用“现代”一词？实际上，法定解释的标准和风格显然会随着时间而改变。Neil Duxbury 在其著作 Elements of Legislation1 中提供了有用的指南。他提出的是法院对立法解释的态度随着法官和立法机关相对宪法角色的概念而变化。这反过来反映了司法对作为英国宪法安排基础的政治原则的理解的转变。成文解释嵌入宪法，近40年来，宪法经历了一个变迁的过程。鉴于 Laws J（当时的他）可以在 1998 年的一项重要判决中写道“普通法通常不使用宪法权利的语言”2，我们现在经常使用基本普通法权利的概念3，甚至普通法宪政主义的概念，不管这对不同的作者意味着什么。在中世纪，法规被视为实际上是普通法的一部分。它们就像高等法院的判决，被编入